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UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 15 AUTUMN 1947 NUMBER I
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: 1946-47*
Jom P. FRANXtB yTHE fall of i947, it has become possible to make tentative ap-
praisal of the status of the present Court in relation to the cycle of
liberal and conservative sentiment in the country in recent years.
During this century, the country as a whole has alternately inclined to-
ward a liberal or a conservative set of policies. Theodore Roosevelt was
followed by Taft, Wilson by Normalcy, and now perhaps another Roose-
velt is to be followed by another Taft.
We can now see that the peak of New Deal liberalism in Congress came
in 1935 and 1936.1 There the recession set in immediately after the elec-
tion of 1936 despite the landslide, and became a rout at the polls in 1938.2
In the White House the plateau of the liberal spirit ended after the years
1937 and 1938. After the Fair Labor Standards Act of the latter year, the
President's attention drifted away from the domestic economy. 3
* This article purports to be as much a social survey as a legal analysis of the work of the
Supreme Court at the last term. It is based on the fundamental belief that the Supreme Court
of the United States is, and always has been, either consciously or unconsciously, a policy-
making institution of the government. Any reader who has made up his mind that this
proposition is unsound, or who has made up his mind that the Supreme Court is divided
between "judicial activists" and "champions of self-restraint," will surely find what follows
unrewarding. This is not to say that the Justices do not declare "law," but that there is
large enough room at the interstices for predilection. A large portion of this article, though
not all, is given to looking at those interstices.
t Assistant Professor of Law, Indiana University Law School.
'For a chronicle of these years see 2 Morison and Commager, The Growth of the American
Republic 586-617 (942); Schlesinger, The New Deal In Action 1-32, 47-51 (1940).
2 Consider, for example, the struggles over the Supreme Court Bill and the Reorganization
Plan. For a discussion of the election of z938 see What the Election Means, go New Republic
57 (Nov. 23, 1938); Clapper, Return of the Two-Party System, 49 Current History 13 (Dec.,
1938).
3 For an illustration of the drift of President Roosevelt's attention from domestic to foreign
affairs, see Perkins, The Roosevelt I Knew 347-87 (i947).
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In the Supreme Court, as always, there was a time lag. Lifetime ap-
pointments give some insulation against the course of the elections, and
the accident of multiple appointments falling to one president may long
affect the course of judicial events.4 But the drift has now been long
enough for this hypothesis to emerge: the liberal movement of the New
Deal, which reached its peak in Congress and the White House in the
thirties, came to its climax in the Supreme Court in the October 1942 and
1943 terms.5 In those years, the Hope Natural Gas case' was decided; the
first flag-salute decision toppled; 7 use of the streets for free speech re-
ceived its maximum protection;8 the white primary was overthrown in
Texas; 9 the insurance business was held to be subject to the Sherman
Act;10 and extorted confessions in state courts were freely disallowed.-
Since the Hartford Empire decision 2 in the 194:4 term, the path of the
Court, at first irregularly but now with apparent consistent direction, fol-
lows a new and distinctly conservative trend. The Court is still, fairly
dearly, the most liberal branch of the federal government; but the lines
of deep philosophic difference between the Taft Congress, the Truman
White House, and the Vinson Court are becoming fairly hard to draw.
4 A president should be precluded by statute from appointing more than two, or per-
haps three Supreme Court Justices in one four-year term. It would be better to have one or
two vacancies for one or two years than to permit a president so heavy a hand in shaping the
law of the future without requiring that president to be reanointed at the polls. There is weak-
ness in a democracy when Presidents Taft and Harding, who together occupied the White
House about six years between 1902 and 1923, appointed nine members of the Supreme
Court, while Presidents Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, in office the remaining
fifteen years of that period, appointed only six members. Taft was overwhelmingly defeated
when he ran for re-election and the scandals probably would have defeated Harding had he
lived. Roosevelt and Wilson were both re-elected. Yet Taft and Harding averaged 1.5 appoint-
ments a year while Roosevelt and Wilson averaged 0.4 appointments.
5 Though "liberalism" and "conservatism" are not easy to define when applied to political
institutions, they are not devoid of meaning even when applied to courts and judges. Thus, we
make understandable sense when we say that Mr. Justice Holmes was a liberal and* Mr.
Justice Brewer a conservative justice. The point perhaps can be made by example: in consti-
tutional law, the decision in Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877), or the dissent in Abrams v.
United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (192o), are liberal. In torts, McPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,
217 N.Y. 382, 1II N.E. io5o (I916), and in labor law, Commonwealth v. Hunt, 4 Metc.
(Mass.) i1 (1842), are liberal decisions. They have a common denominator of imaginative
humanitarianism salted with artistry and self-restraint.
6Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1943).
7 Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (i94o), overruled in West Virginia
State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
s Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 329 U.S. 105 (I943).
9 Smith v. Allwright, 32I U.S. 649 ('944).
1o United States v. Southeastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
x Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944).
12 Hartford Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 (1945); 324 U.S. 570 (1945).
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I. HIGH SPOTS OF THE YEAR
At the 1946 term there were perhaps eight cases which were of the high-
est social and legal importance. Of these, the most spectacular were the
Lewis case'3 and the California Tidelands case.' 4
In more nearly conventional fields, the liberal view prevailed in only
one of the eight major cases. A long step was taken toward equalization of
southern and western freight rates in New York v. United States.' In an-
other segment of the economy, the taxing power of the states was seem-
ingly more sharply limited than in any decision in twenty years, and the
entire contribution of the late Chief Justice to this vital subject was men-
aced, if not largely washed away. 6
In the field of civil liberties, four cases of major importance arose. One
dealt with search and seizure;'7 two with various aspects of a fair trial;
and one, the Hatch Act cases, with freedom of speech. 9 In all four, the
claimed civil right was denied. In the course of these cases, the basic rela-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Bill of Rights was reappraised-
and left where it was found.
The term was also of note as the first for Mr. Chief Justice Vinson, and
the first since the hostility of one member of the Court for another was
sensationally brought to the attention of the public in June 1946. 20 The
cases, and particularly these major decisions, the work of the individual
Justices, and the alignments of the Court are discussed in detail in the sec-
tions which follow.
II. THE REGULATION OF LABOR AND BUSNESS
LABOR
At the time of the railway strike in May 1946, President Truman asked
the Congress for, among other remedies, an amendment to the Norris-
'3 The various United Mine Workers and John L. Lewis petitions and cross-petitions,
United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 67 S. Ct. 677 (1947), will be referred to as
the Lewis case hereafter.
14 United States v. California, 67 S. Ct. z658 (1947).
"567 S. Ct. 1207 (1947).
'
6 Freeman v. Hewit, 67 S. Ct. 274 (1946).
17 Harris v. United States, 67 S. Ct. 1o98 (1947).
is Adamson v. California, 6 7 S. Ct. 1672 (1947), and Foster v. Illinois, 67 S. Ct. 1716 (1947).
"g United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 67 S. Ct. 556 (1947), and Oklahoma v. United
States Civil Serv. Com'n, 67 S. Ct. 544 (i947), will be referred to hereafter as the Hatch
Act cases.
2"Mr. Justice Jackson's charges against Mr. Justice Black are reviewed in Frank, Dis-
qualification of Judges, 56 Yale L.J. 6o5, n. 2, 3, 5 (1947).
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LaGuardia Act to permit the government to obtain injunctions in such
cases. 2' His bill passed the House at once, but died in the Senate when the
railroad strike ended.
As a result, when a coal strike was threatened in November 1946, the
government had no effective way to break it. The mines were already in
government "possession," but nominal "seizure" of property by posting
a placard and running up a flag lost efficacy as a strike stopper with the
end of the war. However, on November i8th, the Department of justice
convinced federal district Judge Goldsborough that the President's re-
quest for an amendment to the Norris-LaGuardia Act had been unneces-
sary; and that the Act did not preclude injunctions obtained by the gov-
ernment against strikes on properties the government had seized. Judge
Goldsborough issued a temporary restraining order against Lewis and the
United Mine Workers prohibiting the strike. The strike proceeded none-
theless, and on December 4th, Judge Goldsborough fined Lewis $io,ooo
and the United Mine Workers $3,500,000, the latter sum being the biggest
fine in American history.22 On December 9 th the Supreme Court granted
certiorari, by-passing the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.23
The largest issues in the case were jurisdictional.The Norris-LaGuardia
Act excluded from federal jurisdiction the power to issue injunctions "in
any case involving or growing out of any labor dispute," with exceptions
and qualifications immaterial here.24 In addition, it was familiar equity
doctrine that a void order need not be obeyed, and that a party could not
be punished for ignoring it.25 A majority of the Court used two different
jurisdictional theories to uphold the government. The first theory was
that the Act did not cover strikes by government employees and that
the coal miners were government employees by virtue of the seizure. This
was buttressed by the hoary crypticism that statutes are not to be con-
strued against the sovereign.2 6 Theory two was that the district court at
least had that quantum of jurisdictiodi which would permit it to decide
21 H.R. 6578, 79th Cong. 2d Sess. (1946); § 5 authorized the Attorney General to ask for
injunctions against certain strikes and provided "upon the filing of such petition, the Court
shall have all the power and jurisdiction of a court of equity" unlimited by the Norris-
LaGuardia Act.
- United States v. United Mine Workers, 70 F. Supp. 42 (.C., 1946).
33 United States v. United Mine Workers, 67 S. Ct. 359 (1946).
24 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ ioi and 104 (1932).
2S Referred to by Mr. Justice Rutledge dissenting in the Lewis case, 67 S. Ct. 677, 726-27
(1947).
26 The majority relied on four 1873 to 1912 decisions. Ibid., at 686. The "rule" had since
been very sharplylimited. United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936); Nardone v. United
States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937).
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whether it had jurisdiction or not. The jurisdictional issue was said to be
fairly arguable, and hence the parties could be. required to obey the tem-
porary restraining order while the federal courts reached a leisurely deci-
sion on the contested issue.
On the second point, the Court relied upon United States v. Shipp,27
which had held in contempt a sheriff partially responsible for the lynching
of a prisoner whose case was pending on appeal in the Supreme Court and
for whose protection a stay order had been issued. The sheriff argued that
the Court could not punish for contempt since it had no jurisdiction to
issue the stay. In the Shipp case, the Court held the sheriff punishable,
using somewhat ambiguous language on the vital point. That case is open
to the construction that jurisdiction to punish for contempt of a void order
exists, but exists only where the contempt by itself completely moots the
dispute. This is the likely limitation, for several times before and after
the Shipp decision, the Court had repeated the usually accepted principle
that violation of a void order was not punishable. In the Lewis case the
Court reached its result by relying on the Shipp case and ignoring the
decisions prior and subsequent to the Shipp decision. The Lewis decision
thus presumably overrules subsilentio such one-time leading cases as In re
Sawyer.28
Mr. Chief Justice Vinson, who wrote the main opinion and gave the
judgment of the Court, relied on both theories. Justices Frankfurter and
Jackson dissented as to the Act, but came to the same result by using the
Shipp doctrine. Justices Black and Douglas used the Act theory exclu-
sively.
Justices Murphy and Rutledge, dissenting completely, gave the major-
ity a hard battle. Mr. Justice Murphy put the central problem thus:
.... Some future government could easily utilize seizure as a subterfuge for break-
ing any or all strikes in private industries. Under some war-time or emergency power,
it could seize private properties at the behest of the employers whenever a strike
threatened or occurred .... on the specious theory that the government was acting
in relation to its own employees ..... After the strike was broken, the properties
would be handed back to the private employers. That essentially is what has happened
in this case. 9
Mr. Justice Rutledge, in a brilliant opinion in which Mr. Justice Mur-
phy joined, made the major attack. Mr. Justice Frankfurter had shown
that the Norris-LaGuardia Act barred the suit. Rutledge agreed and add-
27 203 U.S. 563 (igo6).
28 124 U.S. 2oo (1888), and cases referred to by Mr. Justice Rutledge. See note 25 supra.
29 Lewis case, 67 S. Ct. 677, 718 (947) (italics added).
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ed. He showed, with abundant citation, the error of the Court's use of the
Shipp case and showed also why the procedure of the trial court in pun-
ishing for contempt had been unsound. Although the majority scaled
down the fine by 8o per cent, the dissent declared that the fine was en-
tirely inappropriate. Justices Black and Douglas joined with the dis-
sent on this ruling, but on the ground that a conditional fine would have
been sufficient.
As between the two devices of exception, the Norris-LaGuardia Act and
the Shipp rule, the latter is the more undesirable. The statutory interpre-
tation is ephemeral-indeed, Congress has already by the Taft-Hartley
Act amended the Norris-LaGuardia Act in respect to important strikes,30
and the plant seizure power has lapsed; so that the decision on that point
is of no further consequence. The Shipp rule, as revised and declared, will
be less easily escaped, for it will enter into the fabric of equity jurispru-
dence. The majority attempted to limit its doctrine to cases in which the
basic jurisdictional dispute was "substantial"; to which Mr. Justice
Murphy replied that "the minds of lawyers and judges are boundless in
their ability to raise serious jurisdictional objections,"'3" and the Norris-
LaGuardia Act will give full scope to that legal ingenuity. The federal
lower courts will probably, in sporadic instances, raise hob for years with
labor relations before the Supreme Court clarifies what it means by "sub-
stantial."32
In the Lewis case, the Court did two important things; in terms of eco-
nomics it broke a strike which, without regard to the merits, had to stop
in the nation's interest; and in terms of politics, it rescued an administra-
tion bankrupt of a labor policy. At least the first of these results had to
be achieved by some instrumentality. Mr. Justice Murphy acknowledged
as much. But he added:
.... those factors do not permit the conversion of the judicial process into a weapon
for misapplying statutes according to the grave exigencies of the moment. That can
have tragic consequences even more serious and lasting than a temporary dislocation
of the nation's economy resulting from a strike of the miners.3"
30 Labor Management Relations Act (i947), § 208 (b), 29U.S.C.A. § i78 (b) (Supp., 1947).
H.R. 3020, 8oth Cong. (Pub. L. No. iox, June 23, 1947).
3 Lewis case, 67 S. Ct. 677, 79 (i947).
3State courts may quickly follow this lead with their "little Norris-LaGuardia Acts."
In an unreported instance coming to the author's attention, a state trial court in Indiana issued
a temporary restraining order against a strike despite the Indiana statute, Ind. Stat. Ann.
(Burns, 1933) s. 4o-5o, on the ground of the Court's "doubts" concerning jurisdiction.
33 Lewis case, 67 S. Ct. 677, 717 (1947). This case suggests that it may be unfortunate for
the Court to use its power to hear cases without letting them sift through the lower courts.
The pressure to reach a particular result because of the emergency of circumstance is, as Mr.
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In addition to the Lewis decision, there were several other important
labor cases. In the United Brotherhood case, 34 an antitrust action by the
United States alleging a union-management conspiracy to restrain trade in
lumber products in the San Francisco area, the Court held that by virtue
of Section 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, a union was not responsible for
the wrongful acts of its officers in the absence of clear-cut proof of direct
authorization by the union as a body. Mr. Justice Frankfurter dissented
strongly, joined by the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Burton, contending
that under this interpretation "the Sherman Law will be sterilized, cer-
tainly so far as national labor unions are concerned. ' ' 3s Mr. Justice Reed,
for the majority, denied that his decision had any such effect. However
the statutory language itself, which provides that unions shall not be liable
for the acts of their officers, "except upon clear proof of actual participa-
tion in, or actual authorization of"' 6 those acts, may well come close to
providing practical union immunity. Short of rewriting the statute, there
appears to be little the Court can do about it.
Several constitutional issues were raised in the case of Petrillo,37 charged
by the United States with criminal violation of the 1946 statute forbidding
efforts to coerce a radio broadcasting company to employ "any person or
persons in excess of the number of employees needed." The trial court
found the statute void for indefiniteness, and also found that it violated
the First and Thirteenth Amendments. The Supreme Court declined to
pass on the latter defense prior to trial, but reversed on the asserted lack
of definiteness. Mr. Justice Black, for the majority, held that the Consti-
tution did not forbid anti-featherbedding legislation. He acknowledged
that such legislation was difficult to word with precision, but held that so
long as the government must prove that the loosely described offense had
been "wilfully" committed, the statute was definite enough.
A lively political issue was presented in the case of Trailmobile Co. v.
Justice Rutledge in the Lewis case reminded his brethren by quoting Mr. Justice Holmes,
strong in "great cases"; and in "great cases," the vice is that "immediate interests exercise a
kind of hydraulic pressure which makes what previously was clear seem doubtful, and before
which even settled principles of law will bend." Mr. Justice Holmes, dissenting, Northern
Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400-1 (19o4). For a careful analysis of the de-
cision see Watt, The Divine Right of Government by the Judiciary, i4 Univ. Chi. L. Rev.
409 (947).
34 United Brotherhood v. United States, 67 S. Ct. 775 (i947).
3 Ibid., at 786.
3647 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C.A. § io6 (1932); cf. § 3or (e) of the Taft-Hartley Act for a
carefully drawn provision intended to be quite different.
37 United States v. Petrillo, 67 S.' Ct. 1538 (1947).
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Whirls.35 Ever since the end of the war, the law enforcement authorities
of the government have nervously feared the possibility that they might
have to take sides between labor and the veterans -on the rights of return-
ing veterans to their jobs. Section 8 of the Selective Service Act provides
that veterans should be reinstated in their jobs for one year, with seniority.
In the October 1945 term the Court held that the Act gave veterans that
seniority which they would have had if they had never been in service, and
no more.39 Hence a veteran could be laid off during the guaranteed year if
there was no work for one of his seniority standing to do. In the Whirls
case at the October 1946 term the Court held that the seniority right, like
the employment right itself, expired at the end of the year granted by
Congress.
In addition to the fairly spectacular labor cases just outlined, the term
had the usual grist of Wagner Act and wage-hour litigation. Of the six
Wagner Act cases, two dealt with the coverage of plant guards,4 ° one with
the mechanics of holding elections,4' and one with a refusal to bargain.42
The other two involved the sharply debated issue of the coverage of fore-
men under the Act.43
The seven Fair Labor Standards Act cases-5 per cent of all the cases
heard on all subjects during the year-were on small points with one ex-
ception. In the Halliburton Oil case, 44 the 1942 Belo rule,45 which had been
3s 67 S. Ct. 982 (1947). 39 Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock Corp., 328 U.S. 275 (1946).
40 NLRB v. E. C. Atkins & Co., 67 S. Ct. 1265 (1947) and NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., 67 S. Ct. 1274 (1947).
4x NLRB v. A. J. Tower Co., 6 7 S. Ct. 324 (1946).
42 NLRB v. Donnelly Garment Co., 67 S. Ct. 756 (1947).
43 Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 67 S. Ct. 789 (i947), held that foremen were "em-
ployees" of the concerns for which they worked and hence were covered by the Act in which
"employees" is the key word of definition. Mr. Justice Jackson wrote the majority opinion and
Mr. Justice Douglas wrote a dissent in which the Chief justice and Justices Burton and
Frankfurter largely joined. None doubted that foremen were entitled to organize; the ques-
tion was merely whether employers were entitled to fight foremen organizations by refusal to
bargain, threats of discharge, use of labor spies, and the other pre-Wagner Act practices. Con-
gress has already amended the Act to undo the Jackson decision and restore these privileges to
those employers who want them. Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, § 101, 29 U.S.C.A.
§ 151 (Supp., 1947), amending § 2 of the National Labor Relations Act. The amendment
nullifies the effect of a second decision that the federal Act precluded state regulation on the
same subject. Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Rel. Bd., 67 S. Ct. 1026 (1947).
44 Walling v. Halliburton Oil Well Co., 67 S. Ct. io56 (1947).
4S Walling v. A. H. Belo Corp., 316 U.S. 624 (1942). The Belo rule is the only substantial
hole which the Court has found in the Act. Under it, for example, an employer who was paying
an employee $27.50 a week at the time of the passage of the Act could enter into a contract
with the employee providing that he should receive $o.5o an hour plus "not less than" time
and one-half for overtime, "but not less than $27.50 a week." The employer was thus per-
mitted, by use of the verbal formula, to work the employee fifty hours a week without paying
any more for a fifty-hour week after theAct than he paid for a forty-hour week before.
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confined narrowly to its facts in numerous subsequent decisions, was re-
affirmed. The Belo case was decided 5 to 4 in 1942. In 1947 Mr. Justice
Byrnes, the fifth justice of "the Belo majority, had been replaced by Mr.
Justice Rutledge who in the Halliburton case made it perfectly clear that
he considered the Belo rule unsound. The primary issue this year thus was
not whether the Belo rule should be approved, but rather whether in the
intervening years employers had come to rely on it to such an extent that
it could not fairly be changed except by prospective legislation. The ma-
jority held, in the circumstances, that "Even if we doubted the wisdom of
the Belo decision as an original proposition, we should not be inclined to
part from it at this time.' ' 6 Justices Murphy and Black would have pre-
ferred to overule it.
POWER TO TAX
Governments must have revenue sufficient to function, and as the
duties and costs of government expand, it becomes progressively more
difficult to find that revenue. Federal tax expansion drives the states to
new sources of income. State social legislation, and indeed the whole proc-
ess of decentralization of government, depends on adequate state incomes,
and many state treasurers are scraping the bottom of their resources. 47
And now, after years of vacillation, the Supreme Court has finally taken
a stand sharply restricting state revenue.
It is of course not easy to decide exactly what effect the commerce
clause should have on the state taxing power. It would be easy enough to
say that it should have no effect; or, more moderately, that state taxes
affecting commerce should usually be valid unless directly discriminating
against interstate commerce. But only Justices Black, Douglas, and Mur-
phy will take this stand;48 and the remaining judges are forced to work out
some formula, if they can, for determining when state taxation excessively
burdens commerce, and when it does not.
46 Walling v. Halliburton Oil Well Co., 67 S. Ct. ios6, io6o (1947). The case raises the
question of the weight to be given principles of stare decisis in statutory interpretation. This
question was considered in some detail by Mr. Justice Rutledge, concurring, and Mr. Justice
Murphy, dissenting, in Cleveland v. United States, 67 S. Ct. 13, x6, 18 (1946). For further
discussion see Horack, Congressional Silence, A Tool of Judicial Supremacy, 25 Tex. L. Rev.
247 (I947); and Note, 59 Harv. L. Rev. 1277 (1946).
47 See Dunham, Gross Receipts Taxes on Interstate Transactions, 47 Col. L. Rev. 211,
215-16 (1947).
48 Their dissenting positions in Nippert v. Richmond, 327 U.S. 416, 435 (946) are some
indications of this view. The entire subject of commerce clause restrictions on state action
was recently reviewed by Professor Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power-Revised
Version, 47 Col. L. Rev. 547 (1947). The American practice of state regulation prior to Mar-
shall's earliest decision on the point is analyzed in a gigantic research job, Abel, Commerce
Regulation before Gibbons v. Ogden, 25 N. C. L. Rev. 121 (1947).
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The Court was again faced with this problem this year in Freeman v.
Hewit,49 a case which had been on the docket for three years. In that case,
an Indiana resident sold stock through a broker on the New York Stock
Exchange. The transaction was subject to the New York stock transac-
tions tax, which was pot in question in this case. It was also subject to the
Indiana gross income tax; which is to say that the seller was required by
Indiana law to pay to the state of Indiana a tax of approximately i per
cent on all of his gross income, of which the stock sale income was a part.
The issue in the case was whether, in view of the interstate nature of the
stock sale, the income could be taxed by Indiana. The court held that it
could not.
The case and all the relevant decisions have been annotated ably by
Professor Allison Dunham,s° and the authorities are too complicated for
discussion here. Suffice it to say that the late Mr. Chief Justice Stone had
devised a functional approach to the problem of state taxation affecting
interstate commerce by which the states could get revenue while com-
merce remained reasonably unburdened. He had evolved the so-called
"multiple burden test," validating taxes on commerce where the local in-
terest is genuine and where the tax is unlikely to be so often repeated in
different jurisdictions as to cripple the commerce.5z
Mr. Justice Frankfurter's opinion for the Court in Freeman v. Hewit
either sidestepped or scuttled the Stone approach. The precedents were
disposed of airily: "Language alters, and there is a fashion in judicial writ-
ing as in other things."5'2 And with the changing fashions went the multi-
ple burden approach which, if discussed at all, was scorned. For the cur-
rent fashion, we get a new-old formula: this tax is forbidden because it is
"a direct tax on interstate sales." This particular formula has not been
popular since the DiSanto case which was overruled in an opinion by Mr.
Chief Justice Stone in 1941 .53 Of the argument that the state can scarcely
afford to give up major sources of revenue, the Court cheerfully says,
"Revenue serves as well no matter what its source. '54 Or, as Professor
Dunham paraphrases the majority, "Let them eat cake."55
49 67 S. Ct. 274 (1946)-
so Dunham, op. cit. supra note 47; see also articles cited in note 59 infra.
51 Magill, Stone on Taxation, 46 Col. L. Rev. 747, 753-57 (I946); Konefsky, Chief Justice
Stone and the Supreme Court 48-97 (1945).
s2 Freeman v. Hewit, 67 S. Ct. 274, 277 (1946).
S3 DiSanto v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34, 37 (i927), overruled by California v. Thompson,
313 U.S. 109 (1941).
54 Freeman v. Hewit, 67 S. Ct. 274, 277 (946).
-s Dunham, op. cit. supra note 47, at 216.
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It was surprising that Mr. Justice Burton, with his own experiences
with inadequate local revenue and with his regard for precedent, and the
Chief Justice, with his years of practical tax experience, should have joined
the majority opinion. However, it was soon apparent that Mr. Chief Jus-
tice Vinson has a very restrictive notion of the states' taxing power. He
and Mr. Justice Jackson are apparently the members of the Court most
hostile to state taxes affecting commerce, s6 and they alone dissented in
what appeared to be a clearly valid tax on coal at rest in New Jersey be-
fore being moved into New York.s7
In justice to Freeman v. Hewit it must be acknowledged that the pri-
mary shock of the case comes not from its result but from its language and
theory. The same result could have been reached with simple citation of
Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen,s5 or, more happily, on the theory offered in Mr.
Justice Rutledge's concurrence. One cannot know with assurance whether
the menacing tone of the case is more than an exuberant lesson in legisla-
tive draftsmanship s9 That it is only this may be indicated by the unani-
mous opinion in International Harvester Co. v. Evatt,6o which upheld an
Ohio "franchise tax" based on a complex apportionment of the corpora-
s
6 Mr. Justice Jackson's attitude on the basic problem of the negative commerce clause is
very clearly expressed in his concurring opinion in Duckworth v. Arkansas, 34 U.S. 390, 397-
402 (1941).
57 Independent Warehouses v. Scheele, 67 S. Ct. xo62 (1947). The problem of state revenue
and the Constitution also arose in connection with a claim that a Rhode Island tax on a
Rhode Island trustee of a New York estate, where the property consisted of intangibles in
New York, violated the due process clause. The Court held 6 to 3, that constitutional prin-
ciples permit a state to tax an interest in foreign intangibles, but not foreign tangibles, and
that consequently, this, a tax on intangibles, was constitutional. Greenough v. Tax Assessors,
67 S. Ct. 1400 (1947). Mr. Justice Reed wrote the majority opinion and Justices Murphy,
Jackson, Rutledge, and the Chief Justice dissented. For an attack on the rationality of the
distinction for constitutional purposes between taxes on tangibles and taxes on intangibles,
see Bittker, Taxation of Out-of-State Tangible Property, 56 Yale L.J. 640 (1947).
A third constitutional clause restricting the state taxing power in addition to the com-
merce clause and the due process clause was considered this year. In Richfield Oil Corp. v.
State Board of Equalization, 67 S. Ct. i56 (1946), Mr. Justice Douglas wrote the opinion of
the Court holding invalid a general California sales tax as applied to oil sold by pumping
from taxpayers' tanks into a purchaser's tanker for immediate foreign delivery. The opinion
rested on Art. i, § 1o, cl. 2 of the Constitution forbidding taxation of exports. Mr. Justice
Black in a lone dissent (Mr. Justice Murphy not participating) showed very clearly that this
was a misuse of Art. I, § 1o, cl. 2. Justices Douglas and Rutledge also thought the clause in-
validated in part the gross receipts tax on New York stevedores. Joseph v. Carter & Weeks
Stevedoring Co., 67 S. Ct. 8IS, 822, 827 (1947).
5304 U.S. 307 (1938).
s9 Professor Powell, More Ado About Gross Receipts Taxes, 6o Harv. L. Rev. 5o, 710, 723
(i947), treats the Freeman case as a simple application of Adams Mfg. Co. principles and
s not alarmed about it. A note, 56 Yale L. J. 898 (1947), treats the case as "A Change in
Doctrine." See also Recent Cases, 14 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 503 (1947).
6' 67 S. Ct. 444 (1947).
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tion's intrastate and interstate business. Mr. Justice Black for the Court
said, "A state's tax law is not to be nullified merely because the result is
achieved through a formula which includes consideration of interstate and
out-of-state transactions in their relation to the intrastate privilege." 6'
So long as apportionment achieves no "unfair result," the "privilege of
doing local Ohio business" may be taxed. This suggests that focus on ap-
portionment and on the intrastate "privilege" must be the draftsman's
objective.
In Freeman v. Hewit, Justices Black, Douglas, and Murphy dissented,
and Mr. Justice Rutledge concurred specially to suggest his own formula
for the multiple-burden test.62 In Joseph v. Carter & Weekes,63 involving a
New York tax on the gross receipts of stevedoring companies engaged in
loading and unloading vessels for commerce, the Freeman v. Hewit major-
ity of five again invalidated the tax. This time, however, the opinion was
written by Mr. Justice Reed, who exhibited a real concern for state reve-
nue problems, and who stayed carefully within the boundaries of a prece,
dent squarely in point on taxation and the stevedore industry.64 Justices
Black, Douglas, Murphy, and Rutledge dissented on the commerce point.
As Mr. Justice Douglas observed, there was no possibility of multiple
burden in the situation. He sadly concluded that "The failure of the Court
to adhere to the philosophy of our recent cases corroborates the impres-
sion which some of us had that Freeman v. Hewit marked the end of one
cycle under the Commerce Clause and the beginning of another."6 5
The new cycle, if new cycle it be, bodes ill for the economy. It not only
jeopardizes state revenues, but may tend to force state taxation off fairly
innocuous transaction taxes and on to a general sales tax payable directly
by those elements in the community least able to bear it. The new "fash-
ion" is discriminatory against intrastate transactions-if the Indiana
stock seller need not contribute to the revenues of the state, someone in
Indiana will have to make up his share. Finally, it is confusing in an area
which more than almost any other area demands clarity and simplicity.
As a practical matter, state taxes are levied by legislators who frequently
can have very little comprehension of excessively complicated legal no-
61 Toid., at 447.
62 The concurrence is scorned, Powell, op. cit. supra note 59 at 730, and praised, Dunham,
op. cit. supra note 47 at 218. The concurrence is the clearest and best thought-out statement
of the multiple-burden theory.
63 67 S. Ct. 8.S (1947).
64 Puget Sound Stevedoring Co. v. Tax Commission, 3o2 U.S. go (1937).
6s Joseph v. Carter & Weekes, 67 S. Ct. 85, 827 (1947).
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tions; and they are drafted by underpaid assistants in state offices who are
frequently hard put to keep pace with shifting "fashions." 66
To solve this problem, Professors Sutherland and Vinciguerra of Cornell
University this year made an elaborate proposal for congressional action
to untangle the legal snarl.67 The proposal is worth pushing.
MONOPOLY AND FREE ENTERPRISE
Case of the year in business regulation was the railway rate decision
upholding an Interstate Commerce Commission order raising class rates
in Official Territory and lowering them elsewhere. 6" The case was an after-
math of the years of southern effort, particularly by Governor Arnall, to
equalize the position of the South in the national economy.69 Spurred, per-
haps, by the indication in the State of Georgia case70 that if the Commission
did not move toward rate equalization, the Court would intervene with its
equity power, the Commission finally acted. The majority, through an
opinion by Mr. Justice Douglas, upheld the Commission. Justices Jackson
and Frankfurter dissented.
There were questions in the case of power and of evidence. The majority
justices, accustomed as they were to being somewhat critical of Inter-
state Commerce Commission findings where the Commission ruling served
monopolistic interests, were required here to find the evidence sufficient;
the minority, accustomed to upholding the Commission's findings in other
cases, here had to find them inadequate. But the largest issue was one of
theory. The opinion further establishes the fundamental proposition that
in regulating railroad rates, there is a public interest to be considered
above and beyond the interests of particular shippers and particular car-
riers. Railroad rates are to be adjusted from the standpoint of the entire
national good, and this includes regional welfare. The majority held that
just as rates may be adjusted to keep a competitive balance among types
of carriers, so they may be adjusted to keep a competitive balance among
the regions of America even though this resulted in an increased revenue
for northern roads beyond their immediate needs. It was to this proposi-
tion that the dissent was aimed.
6The devices by which Indiana will try to continue to collect as large a gross receipts tax
as possible after Freeman v. Hewit are described in Note, 2 nd. L. J. 252 (1947).-
67 Sutherland and Vinciguerra, The Octroi and the Airplane, 32 Corn. L. Q. 16x (1946).
68New York v. United Statet, 67 S. Ct. 1207 (x47).
69 For discussion, see Arnall, The Shore Dimly Seen i65-85 (1946).
70 Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 324 U.S. 439 (1945). The opinion is well discussed in
Tally, The Supreme Court, the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Freight Rate
Battle, 25 N. C, L. Rev. 172 (I947) . .
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There were two antitrust cases during the term, the National Leadl'
and the Yellow Cab72 cases. In the National Lead case, written by Mr. Jus-
tice Burt6n, the major issue concerned the decree. In 192o National Lead
had entered into a cartel with foreign interests to pool patents, divide the
world market, and abstain from competition in titanium pigments, used
in the manufacture of paints, rubber glass, paper, and many other prod-
ucts. By 1933 the Du Pont Company, also a defendant in the National
Lead case, had entered the field and become a somewhat qualified member
of the cartel. This condition continued until 1943, when by the extensive
use of patents practically immunized from challenge by the agreement, the
American defendants, National Lead and Du Pont, controlled well over
90 per cent of the basic types of titanium trade. Two other concerns were
in the field.
The principal issue in the Supreme Court was a provision of the decree
requiring the defendants to license the use of their patents at a reasonable
royalty to whoever desired them. The government and National Lead
sought royalty-free licenses instead. The Court approved the decree as
written as within the sound discretion of the district judge. Mr. Justice
Douglas in dissent with Justices Murphy and Rutledge argued that royal-
ty continuance gave the offenders practical advantage of their long con-
spiracy; and that the price situation was such that allowance of any royal-
ty would give the licensor, who of course would be free of payments, an
undue advantage over possible competitors. Justices Black and Jackson
disqualified.
A small incident may move men deeply who feel nothing when the same
phenomenon is expanded to the point of the incomprehensible. One death
in a traffic accident may cause more concern than Hiroshima. So here.
Two terms ago, in the Hazel Atlas case,73 a patentee in obtaining his patent
used an obvious fraud, long undiscovered. The fraud may not have been
essential to the patent. Long after, solely because of the fraud and without
considering its merits, the Supreme Court invalidated the patent. One
simple fraud in one patent involving one lie skilfully told, when discov-
ered, brought an end to the patent. Yet in the National Lead case, where a
twenty-five year conspiracy against the population of the world involved
many patents and the total production of an important industrial prod-
71 United States v. National Lead Co., 67 S. Ct. r634 (1947).
72 United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 S. Ct. i56o (1947). The Yellow Cab case held that
the Sherman Act forbids a conspiracy to monopolize the sale of cabs in Chicago, and a con-
spiracy to monopolize contracts for transportation of passengers between railroad terminals in
Chicago, but does not reach the remainder of Chicago taxi traffic.
7s Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 250-51 (z944).
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uct, it was held that the offenders might keep their patents and stay in
business with the competitive advantages thus accruing.
Nonetheless, in this case the Court bears only partial responsibility.
Not only the Court, but the government itself has failed to exhibit as yet
full realization of the basic principle of modern antitrust litigation. In
1947 the real issue in antitrust cases is no longer guilt or innocence; the
issue has become the decree. Monopolies have become sufficiently sophisti-
cated not*to mind the epithet "sinner" if nothing is done about it. Hence
the argument over guilt is really ferocious shadow boxing. Yet the govern-
ment still utilizes its primary energies to prove the facts of violation, and
the decree is settled on oral argument and briefing rather than on good
factual proof. Thus in this case Du Pont could and did emphasize that the
government had not laid a factual foundation for the relief requested.74
In this case the principal practical result of royalty-free licensing would
have been to give one defendant, National Lead, a substantial benefit over
the other defendant, Du Pont.75 National Lead founded the cartel, and its
position was not emotionally appealing. In another case on a different rec-
ord, before the whole Court, an opposite result on royalty-free patents
may be reached.
, The use of the simple patent monopoly for extension of the monopoly
control of the holder into related fields was limited in one case and left
untouched by another. In the Katzinger-MacGregor cases,7 the issue was
the extent to which a patent licensee is estopped in various situations from
74 In its brief in the Supreme Court, the Du Pont Company asserted the absence of evidence
to show the effect of divestiture of the patents on (a) cost of manufacture; (b) capacity to manu-
facture; (c) quality of products; (d) efficiency of operations; (e) consumer interests. Du Pont
also asserted that there was no evidence of any desire of other concerns to enter the field.
Du Pont brief at 54, United States v. National Lead Co., 67 S. Ct. 1634 (1947).
75 Du Pont has by now developed its technology to the point of being substantially free
of National Lead patents, while National Lead must still use the Du Pont patents. Hence
Du Pont in its brief said: "National Lead now finds itself faced with energetic competition of
the smaller manufacturers and with constantly increasing competition of Du Pont which broke
off from technical exchange with National Lead in 194o. For commercial reasons it now de-
sires a 'free ride.' Certainly this Court should proceed with particular caution before it per-
mits National Lead to utilize this litigation, in which it is the principal offender, for its own
private purposes." Ibid., brief at, 34-45.
For a brief discussion of the problem of remedy against a full background of discussion of
contemporary need for application of the antitrust laws, see Levi, Antitrust Laws and Monopo-
ly, i4 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. i53, 182 (i947). A brilliant and comprehensive analysis of the
failure of the watered-down remedies approved by the Supreme Court in Hartford Empire v.
United States, 323 U.S. 386 (i945); 324 U.S. 570 (1945), to serve a useful purpose is Comment,
Compulsory Patent Licensing by Anti-Trust Decree, 56 Yale L.J. 77, at 96 (1947). For an
analysis of recent theories in the application of the Sherman Act, see Rostow, The New
Sherman Act: A Positive Instrument of Progress, 14 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 567 (1947).
76 Katzinger Co. v. Chicago Metallic Mfg. Co., 67 S. Ct. 416 (i947); MacGregor v. Westing-
house Electric Co., 67 S. Ct. 421 (1947).
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challenging the validity of the patent. In the Sola Electric case,7 7 the late
Mr. Chief Justice Stone had written for the Court that despite a general
principle that licensees cannot challenge the validity of a patent, a li-
censee might do so in an equitable action to enforce a price-flxing agree-
ment in the license. This was considered appropriate since if the patent
were invalid, the licensor would have no right whatsoever to control the
prices of the product emerging from the licensee's use of the license. The
principle is an important one because it serves to limit price-fixing agree-
ments to the minimum contemplated by the patent system. If licensees are
estopped from challenging validity in such a case, the licensor is as a
practical matter free of any challenge to what may be an invalid patent if
only he can license an entire industry.
In the Katzinger case the Court applied the Sola principle where the
licensor sued not for an injunction but for royalties under a terminated
patent which had included a price-fixing clause. The licensor asked for no
relief under that clause. The Court, in a 5 to 4 opinion written by Mr.
Justice Black, held that the Sola principle applied in any case, legal or
equitable, in which reliance was placed on a license which contained price-
fixing clauses, even if those clauses were not involved in the particular
case. Mr. Justice Frankfurter dissented for himself and Justices Reed,
Jackson, and Burton, reaffirming his faith in the principle that a licensee
should not be able to challenge a patent's validity.
In the Transwrap case78 the Court held 5 to 4 that a patentee could in-
dude as a condition of a patent license a requirement that the licensee
should transfer to the licensor any improvement patents he might acquire.
The decision appears to put some limitation on the doctrine of the Mer-
coid case 79 of two years ago, and the dissenting Justices so viewed it.
'The persistent matter of Bruce's Juiceslo gave the Court a new Robin-
son-Patman Act problem. The issue which drew the' primary attention of
the Court was whether, in an action on a note for goods sold, the buyer
can plead as a defense that over a period of years the seller had been ex-
acting discriminatory prices in violation of the Robinson-Patman Act;
and that the amount of the injury suffered by the buyer because of the dis-
crimination is equal to the amount still owing on the notes. The defendant
77 Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson Electric Co., 317 U.S. 17 (1942).
78 Transparent-Wrap. Mach. Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co., 67 S. Ct. 61o (1947),
79 Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (7943).
8o Bruce's Juices v. American Can Co., 67'S. Ct. 1015 (i947), cert. granted, 326 U.S. 711
(1945), aff'd by equally divided Court, 327 U.S. 758 (1946), rehearing granted, 327 U.S. 812
(1946).
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contended that the seller had given quantity discounts to others which
were illegal under the Act. As the dissent put it, "The issue in this case is
whether sellers of goods should be allowed to use the courts to collect price
differentials which have been made illegal by Congress in the Robinson-
Patman Act."'" Since the defense had not been considered by the court
below, it was unnecessary to decide at this stage whether the buyer could
prove the alleged violation.
With two former heads of the Antitrust Division as opposing counsel,
John Lord O'Brian for the seller and Thurman Arnold for the buyer, the
case was dramatically argued. Mr. Justice Jackson for the majority in a
5 to 4 decision held the defense was not permitted by the Act; nor was the
common-law defense of illegality of a contract available, since this was
not an instance in which "in order to prove his own case, a plaintiff proves
his violation of the law ..... -82 In another phrase the Court indicated
that the illegality was separable from the note on which the suit was
brought. The Court refused to go outside the particular transaction and
focused its attention not on injury done the buyer, but on the benefit
given to someone else.
The dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Murphy for Justices Black,
Douglas, and Rutledge moved from a wholly different philosophic start-
ing point. In this view, the power to control the enforceability of contracts
is one which the courts should use to the hilt to spread the effect of the an-
titrust and fair trade laws. The defense of illegality may be used under the
Sherman Act; it may be used in the patent field as in the licensee estoppel
cases previously discussed; and it should also be used in the commercial
relations covered by the Robinson-Patman Act.
The Jackson view, held perfectly consistently by him and by Mr. Jus-
tice Frankfurter, appears repeatedly in the cases discussed in the forego-
ing section and can be summarized thus: In a given case the government
through its controlling agency (commission or court) must focus exclusive-
ly on injury directly done the complaining person rather than on injury
done the public. The competing principle of the minority is: When a per-
son alleges injury from benefits given another, the court or commission
may relieve the individual even though the public rather than the individ-
ual has been the principal sufferer.
Thus in the class freight-rate adjustment case, the Jackson-Frank-
furter view was that the Commission was not free to raise the northern
rates because no party was immediately injured by the northern rates.
81 Bruce's Juices v. American Can Co., 67 S. Ct. ioi5, 1022 (1947).
82 Ibid., at 1021.
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Only the public will benefit by regional equalization. In the patent licens-
ing cases, this philosophy concentrates on the sanctity of the contract of
license, excluding from consideration the effect on the public of a possibly
illegal price exploitation which under our peculiar patent system is, as a
practical matter, likely to be attacked only in an infringement suit. In the
Robinson-Patman case the buyer is left to his statutory remedy because
the particular discrimination is not apparent on the face of the contract in
suit, and the benefits are given to others than the parties. Here, too, the
real injury, if to anyone, is largely to the public which is the prime sufferer
from fettered trade.
The problem emerging from all these cases is then, to what extent is
the public to be considered an impleaded party in every trade regulation
case, able to make a silent plea and receive the benefit of judgment? Must
the pervasive issue of monopoly versus free enterprise be fought out strict-
ly in terms of joined parties and present beneficiaries? 83
FURTHER REGULATIONS OF BUSINESS AND LABOR
There were a few other instances of the direct. regulation of business by
government. The Public Utility Holding Company Act was held valid in
an opinion which dealt primarily with due process questions, but which
also gave the broadest known definition of the commerce power. Mr. Jus-
tice Murphy for the Court said, "The federal commerce power is as broad
as the economic needs of the nation. '8 4 Not long ago, Mr. Justice Suther-
land spoke for a Court which had another view of the matter5 s
In a 5 to 4 opinion, Mr. Justice Black wrote for the Court that the equal
protection clause did not prevent the state of Louisiana and the New Or-
leans harbor pilots from permitting piloting in the harbor to be a family
monopoly handed down from father to son, excluding all others. 6 The
Court held that the pilots were "state officers," that the practice was
nepotism, and that whatever else may be said about it, nepotism is not
unconstitutional. This, like the Lewis case, illustrates the astonishing re-
sults which can be achieved when private workmen are turned into "gov-
ernment employees" by gesture of law. Mr. Justice Rutledge was more
persuasive in dissent with Justices Reed, Douglas, and Murphy when he
83 This basic problem is comprehensively considered in Lockhart, Violation of the Anti-
Trust Laws as a Defense in Civil Actions, 31 Minn. L. Rev. 507 (1947), which includes a dis-
cussion of the principal cases referred to in this text.
84 American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 67 S. Ct. 133, 141 (1946).
8s Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
86 Kotch v. Board of River Port Com'rs, 67 S. Ct. 91o (1947).
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declared that Yick Wo v. Hopkins17 forbids states either in law or in prac-
tice to discriminate by blood in controlling employment.
Other cases were concerned with the operation of administrative ma-
chinery.8"
A decision with an enormous potential for the regulation of business
was the California ocean-waters case. 9 There the ultimate social problem
presented was this: Should the enormous mineral reserves off the coast of
the United States be exploited solely for the benefit of those states which
happened to be located next to them or should these minerals be exploited
for the benefit of all the people of the United States, wherever they happen
to reside? The legal problem was worded differently: The states without
question have dominion over underwater lands within their boundaries, so
long of course as use of the navigable water itself does not interfere with
congressional desire. Should the same rule be extended to waters outside
the littoral boundaries of a state? The Court held that it should not, with
the principal practical result that control over some very important oil
lands passes from Sacramento and Austin to Washington, D.C. Whether
national officials will remain sufficiently impervious to oil company pres-
sures for this change of situs to make a difference remains to be seen. Mr.
Justice Black wrote the majority opinion; Mr. Justice Reed dissented on
the merits; Mr. Justice Frankfurter thought the suit of the United States
should be dismissed without prejudice; and Justice Jackson disqualified.
III. CIVIL RIGHTS
There have been eras of repression in American history, and we are
seemingly diving into another. The first Adams administration, the events
culminating in the Haymarket trial travesty in the i88o's, the First World
War and the black years that followed-each produced its heroes and
87 z18 U.S. 356 (z886).
83 The Court clarified the use of the contempt decree for the enforcement of administrative
subpoenas in Penfleld Co. v. SEC, 67 S. Ct. 918 (1947). In FCC v. WOKO, Inc., 67 S. Ct.
2r3 (1946), it gave full support to a requirement that a person seeking a federal license must
honestly fill out the required forms. In R. R. Donnelley & Sons Co. v. NLRB, 67 S. Ct. 624
(1947) and SEC v. Chenery Corp. 67 S. Ct. 1575 (1947), the Court dealt with the problem
presented when a case is remanded to an administrative agency for failure to consider a cer-
tain matter, and the agency thereupon considers and comes to the same result. The Chenery
case also involved more difficult problems, particularly the capacity of the Commission to make
in effect a rule for the future, not by promulgation of a general rule, but by a decision neces-
sarily retroactive in a particular case. The Court held that there is "a very definite place for
the case-by-case evolution of statutory standards." Ibid., at z58o. The case was rendered
difficult by the conceded absence of deliberate wrongdoing by the management of the corpora-
tion. On the central issue see Note, Retroactive Operation of Administrative Regulations, 6o
Harv. L. Rev. 627 ('947).
89 United States v. California, 67 S. Ct. x658 (1947).
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eventually its reaction.9° But before the spirit of Jeffersofn, Altgeld, and
Hughes could triumph, there were years of injustice, anguish, and despair.
The reinvigoration of the House of Representatives Committee on Un-
Americanism;91 the pursuit of teachers by state politicians; the beginning
of mass government discharges for "subversive activity" either with no
hearing or with a mere mockery of hearing, and legislative restrictions on
the right of labor unions even to inform their members of the voting rec-
ords of Congressmen-these were only a few of the events highlighting
1946-47. If prophecy may be permitted, the trend will gain strength in the
foreseeable future.
In the past, it has been political action rather than Supreme Court ma-
jority decisions which brought the country out of its repressions. The vic-
tory of Jefferson, and not the accession of John Marshall ended the Alien
and Sedition laws. Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson brought the
spirit of tolerance to the country in the twentieth century. The philoso-
phy of the Holmes dissents, coupled with a wearing out of the furies,
helped bring the country to its post-Klan senses. The Supreme Court has
seldom been in the civil rights vanguard when the tensions were strong; 92
indeed it was Supreme Court decisions that sent the Negro part-way back
to bondage after the Civil War. 93
From the present indications, some such inglorious role seems in store
for the Supreme Court majority in the forthcoming years. The zeal of the
Hughes-Stone Courts languishes. Indeed the great "red hunt" among gov-
ernment clerks was waved on by the Court this year when, by denial of
certiorari, it refused even to consider the rights of the employees. Only
Justices Black and Douglas indicated a desire to hear the case. 94
"Civil rights" is a somewhat ambiguous phrase. The Court had at least
fifteen civil rights cases during the term, and of those cases, three were
91 For a, brief reference to the Alien and Sedition Acts and Jefferson, see x Beard, Rise of
American Civilization 376 (1946). A discussion of the Haymarket riot and Altgeld may be
found in Barnard, Eagle Forgotten 96-114, 183-267 (1938). For an account of World War I
and the 192o repressions, and the resistance of Charles Evan Hughes, see Chafee, Free Speech
in the United States 36-357, at 273 (i94i).
9% A good discussion of some of the problems connected with this Committee can be found
in Note, Constitutional Limitations on the Un-American Activities Committee, 47 Col. L.
Rev. 416 (1947) and Note, Congressional Contempt Power in Investigations into the Area
of Civil Liberties, .-. Univ. Chi, L. Rev. 256 (1947). On political tests for government em-
ployment, see Note, 6o Harv. L. Rev. 779 (1947).
9i Ex Parte Milligan, 4 Wall. (U.S.) 2 (1866). is. one noteworthy exception.
93 Civil Rights Cases, zo9 U.S. 3 (1883); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (i896).
94 Friedman v. Schwellenbach, 67 S. Ct. 1302 (1947). Certiorari was originally denied in
this case on March 17, Ibid., at 979, and President Truman signed Exec. Order 9833, directing
employee investigations, on March 21. 12 Fed. Register 1935 (i947).
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unanimously decided.' s The distribution of votes in behalf of or in op-
position to the claimed rights in the nonunanimous cases is shown in
the table below. Strong emphasis must be placed on the fact that the
presentation of this table does not represent a judgment that the vote
in any one or two hard cases represents a justice's basic philosophy of
civil rights. Nonetheless, judgment in one direction in a sizable group of
hard cases may reflect a cast of mind.
Table i shows for 1946 what would have been expected of the senior
members of the Court: that in disputed cases, justices Murphy and Rut-
TABLE 1
DISTRIBUTION OF VOTES IN NONUNANIMOUS
CIVIL RIGHTS CASES
In Support In Denial
of the of theJustice Claimed' Claimed
Right Right
Vinson ........................ 0 12
Black ......................... 8 4
Reed .......................... 2 1o
Frankfurter .................... 2 10
Douglas ....................... 8 4
Murphy ....................... 1o 1
Jackson ........................ 2 9
Rutledge ...................... ii I
Burton ........................ 3 9
ledge almost always uphold claimed civil rights; that justices Black and
Douglas do so appreciably more often than not; and that justices Jackson,
Frankfurter, and Reed seldom do.96 Of the new Justices, Mr. Justice Bur-
9s The Court unanimously decided Eagles v. United States ex rel. Horowitz and (companion
case) same v. Samuel, 67 S. Ct. 313 and 320 (1946); Gibson v. United States, 67 S. Ct. 301
(1946); De Meerleer v. Michigan, 67 S. Ct. 596 (i947). The Court divided in result in Carter
v. Illinois, 67 S. Ct. 216 (1946); Ballard v. United States, 67 S. Ct. 261 (1946); Louisiana ex rel.
Francis v. Resweber, 67 S. Ct. 374 (1947); Everson v. Bd. Educ. Ewing Tp., 67 S. Ct. 504
(1947); Hatch Act cases, 67 S. Ct. 544 and 556 (1947); Haupt v. United States, 67 S. Ct. 874
(i947); Harris v. United States, 67 S. Ct. o98 (1947); Craig v. Harney, 67 S. Ct. 1249
(1947); Fay v. New York, 67 S. Ct. 1613 (1947); Foster v. Illinois, 67 S.Ct. 1716 (1947); Gayes
v. New York, 67 S. Ct. 1711 (i947); and Adamson v. California, 67 S. Ct. x672 (r947). Sunal v.
Large, 67 S. Ct. I588 (1947), perhaps should be included here; it considers the use of habeas
corpus at a point where "procedure" comes close to "civil rights." If the right to do a job
without discrimination because of-family connections is a "civil right," then Kotch v. Board
of River Port Pilot Com'rs, 67 S. Ct. 910 (r947), would also belong here. United States v.
Bayer, 67 S. Ct. 1394 (1947) is perhaps also dominantly a civil rights case; it involves pro-
cedure in a conspiracy trial.
96 Pritchett, The Coming of the New Dissent, xi Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 49, 57 (I43), divided
civil liberty cases of the October Term 1942 by votes for "the individual" and for "the govern-
ment." Of thirty-six votes cast by Justices Black, Douglas, Murphy, and Rutledge in ten cases,
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ton is apparently far more likely to find that a civil right has been denied
than Mr. Chief Justice Vinson. The primary difference made by the sub-
stitution of the new for the old Chief Justice is that it tilts the majority
of the Court in a new direction, away from a vigorous defense of civil
rights.97 On the other hand, a dozen cases, many of which were peculiar,
are an insufficient base for more than a hunch as to Mr. Chief Justice Vin-
son's predilections.
Most civil rights came under the Fourteenth Amendment after the ex-
pansion of substantive due process of law. It had been early held that the
Amendment gave the Court no roving commission to scent out and con-
demn those state laws which were in the judicial mind "unreasonable." '"
But about 189o this view was abandoned, and the Court held first that
rate regulation and later social legislation must run a gauntlet of judicial
scrutiny before its substance could be allowed. 9 This conception expanded
so quickly that by the time Mr. Justice Holmes faced the issue in 19o5, he
accepted without question the major premise that the Court might review
the merit of legislation and disagreed only on the standard of judicial tol-
erance to be applied.I0 Mr. Justice Holmes would not have exercised the
reviewing power as lightly as did his brethren, but he acknowledged that
he had it.
Hence the Bill of Rights, by this course of interpretation, did not lead,
it followed property rights into the protection of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. It followed on the same theory, that the Court might reject un-
reasonable restraints on civil rights or, as Mr. Justice Cardozo put it, re-
straints inimical to "the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty."''
Under this theory, as expressed by Mr. Justice Moody in Twining v. New
the distribution was two for the government, thirty-four for the individual. Of twenty-eight
votes cast in the same cases by Justices Reed, Frankfurter, and Jackson, twenty were for the
government and eight for the individual.
97 Pritchett, ibid., shows that in the same ten cases, Mr. Chief Justice Stone cast three
votes for the Government and seven for the individual.
98 Slaughterhouse Cases, io Wall. (U.S.) 273 (1870); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877).
99 justices Black and Douglas date the beginning of substantive due process from Chicago,
Milwaukee & St. P. R. Co. v. Minnesota (the Minnesota Milk case), 134 U.S. 418 (189o). See
their discussion in Adamson v. California, 67 S. Ct. z672, 16go (1947). Mr. Justice Bradley,
dissenting in the Minnesota Milk case took the same view. Yet while Mr. Justice Blatchford's
majority opinion in that case is ambiguous, it seems probable from his later opinion in Budd v.
New York, 143 U.S. 517 (5892) that he meant the Milk case to exemplify procedural due proc-
ess only. In this view, substantive due process in the field of rate regulation begins with Reagan
v. Farmers Loan and Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362 (1894) or Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898).
zoo Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74-76 (19o5).
ozo Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (i937). Mr. Justice Black joined in this opinion
in his first term on the Court but has evidently reconsidered the matter.
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
JerseyW 0 2 and Mr. Justice Cardozo, not all of the Bill of Rights limits state
power, but only those rights which the Court thinks are sufficiently impor-
tant to warrant inclusion.
This year saw battles over two aspects of that conclusion. First, assum-
ing the Moody-Cardozo theory, is the right to counsel, guaranteed by the
Sixth Amendment, of such importance that the Court should require the
states to protect it? Second, should the whole theory of substantive due
process and judicial review of reasonableness of legislation be put aside in
favor of a counter theory that the Fourteenth Amendment encompasses
the Bill of Rights in its entirety, and no more?
The Court reexamined the latter question in the case of Adamson,103
who had been convicted in a state court in California. Under California
law, the prosecuting attorney and the judge were permitted to comment to
the jury on the fact that Adamson had not chosen to take the stand. Un-
der the federal Constitution, a federal prosecutor did not have such a
privilege, because of the clause in the Fifth Amendment forbidding com-
pulsion of testimony in criminal cases against oneself. °4 The majority
opinion, written by Mr. Justice Reed, held again that the Fourteenth
Amendment did not encompass all of the Bill of Rights, that no substan-
tial injustice was done by the California law, and that the conviction must
be affirmed. In so doing, the opinion necessarily reaffirmed the basic theory
of due process.
A minority of four challenged the whole structure. Justices Black,
Douglas, and Murphy, before justice Rutledge came to the bench, had
declared their belief that the Fourteenth Amendment was never meant to
give the Court power to review the reasonableness of rates or the wisdom
of social legislation.I°5 They went behind the Holmes view that the Four-
teenth Amendment gave the Court power to review the substance of legis-
lation, but that the power should be used sparingly. Instead they took the
original position of Mr. Chief justice Waite that courts had no power to
review such legislation for substance at all."°6
In the Adamson case Mr. Justice Black, joined by Mr. justice Douglas,
gave full elaboration to the remainder of their theory: The Fourteenth
102 211 U.S. 78 (I9o8).
1O Adamson v. California, 67 S. Ct. 1672 (1947).
X04 Such comment is precluded by statute. 20 Stat. 30 (1878), 28 U.S.C.A. § 632 (1878); but
Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his concurring opinion conceded that the statute was unnecessary.
Adamson v. California, 67 S. Ct. 1672, i68o (1947).
105 Federal Power Commission v. Natural Gas Co., 315 U.S. 575, 599 (1942).
106Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877).
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Amendment did not give the Court power to review the desirability of
legislation. It made the Bill of Rights, apparently all of it, a restriction on
the states. The Court was to have no discretion whatsoever to pick and
choose among the clauses or parts of clauses of the Bill of Rights which it
would enforce against state action-in a democracy an appointive court
had no business making such decisions.Y'7
The basic controversy is not new. Mr. Justice Harlan in the nineteenth
century had held the Black-Douglas view on civil rights, but with little
support."' Mr. Justice Frankfurter referred to him in a concurring opinion
in the Adamson case as "an eccentric exception." However, the underlying
thesis challenging the entire conception of substantive due process with-
out special reference to civil rights had the most respectable of antecedents
in Munn v. Illinois°9 and the Slaughterhouse Cases.Y°
Hence the striking aspect of the minority thesis here is not its novelty
but the extent of its support. One more vote, and the Bill of Rights will
be a limitation on the states.
Serious blows were struck at civil liberties this year in the search and
seizure case and the right to counsel cases. In Harris v. United States,-,I the
petitioner was arrested in his apartment by Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion agents who had arrest warrants charging offenses relating to forgery.
They had no search warrants. The agents spent five hours completely ran-
sacking the premises looking for two canceled checks. They never found
the checks, but in a bedroom drawer they found a sealed envelope which,
107The dissent is supported by an elaborate historical appendix tracing the history of the
Fourteenth Amendment in Congress and before the people. It records repeated statements of
supporters of the Amendment that they intended it to make the Bill of Rights a restric-
tion on the states. For example, Senator Howard, who offered the Amendment in the Senate,
detailed the Bill of Rights and said, "The great object of the first section of this Amendment
is, therefore, to restrain the power of the States and compel them at all times to respect these
fundamental guarantees." Adamson v. California, 67 S. Ct. 672, 1703 (1947). This writer
can subscribe to neither the majority nor the minority .view. The minority view, if followed
literally, would result in a requirement for grand'jury procedure in every state criminal action,
and for a civil jury in every case over $20.0o. The majority view denies the constitutional
guaranties of a fair trial with counsel and without self-incrimination to all defendants without
regard to financial condition in state courts. Granting for the sake of argument that the mi-
nority view may have been originally intended, it seems too late now to make so radical a
change in current minor state procedure, particularly when there would be no apparent good,
for example, in inflicting grand jury procedures on those states which do not happen to use it.
If, as the majority contends, due process protects "the essence of a scheme of ordered liberty,"
the problem would be largely solved if the majority would recognize that the right of trial with
counsel, to pick an example, is part of "the essence of a scheme of ordered liberty."
lo Examples are Hurtado v. California, iio U.S. 5z6, 538 (x884); Maxwell v. Dow, X76'
U.S. 581, 605 (igoo); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, r14 (i9o8).
"°9 4 U.S. 113 (1877).
,,0 io Wall. (U.S.) 273 (1870). ' 67 S. Ct. zo98 (1947).
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when torn open, revealed a number of selective service notices and cards.
Harris was charged with having these in his possession in violation of the
Selective Service and Training Act.
The Fourth Amendment forbids "unreasonable searches and seizures"
and provides that "no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized." In this case there was
no search warrant. The theory of the government was that the arrest
warrant permitted the search of the premises where the arrest was made.
The arrest warrant of course did not describe either "the place to be
searched" or "things to be seized."
If an arrest warrant gives the right to search the premises of the arrest,,
then a man's home is his castle only so long as he stays outside of it. In a
series of three cases, the latter two clarifying and perhaps modifying the
first, the Supreme Court had explored the extent to which a search could
be made in connection with an arrest, and those cases declared the govern-
ing principle to be that upon arrest, only visible and accessible evidence
could be taken.112 In the last of the three cases, it was held to be a constitu-
tional violation to search a desk, towel cabinet, and wastebasket upon an
arrest in the accused's office. These cases have generally decried "rummag-
ing" and "ransacking" without a warrant.
In the Harris case, a five-judge majority upheld a conviction based on
evidence found by "rummaging" and "ransacking." If the majority opin-
ion gives general approval to the practice employed, then, realistically
speaking, the power to control searches passes from federal district judges,
operating in the calm of the court, to federal police acting in the excite-
ment of the arrest. It is not, however, at all certain that the Chief Justice
in writing the majority opinion meant to go so far. The Court stressed that
the objects actually discovered were not merely evidence of a crime, but
that their possession was in itself a crime. Since the government was en-
titled to possession of the draft cards, "A crime was thus being conducted
in the very presence of the agents conducting the search. Nothing in the
decisions of this Court gives support to the suggestion that under such cir-
cumstances the law-enforcement officials must impotently stand aside and
refrain from seizing such contraband material."3
The opinion may thus be -limited to the right to seize upon arrest mate-
rial which belongs to the government, the possession of which is a crime.
11 Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927), limited in Go-Bart Importing Co. v.
United States, 282 U.S. 344 (i93i), and United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (z932).
MZ Harris v. United States, 67 S. Ct. 1o98, 1103 (1947).
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Since the Court cited the earlier decisions without any indication of a de-
sire to overrule them, some such limitation is likely. This is further indi-
cated by the fact that the Chief Justice himself, as a member of the Dis-
trict of Columbia Court of Appeals, wrote one of the opinions most broad-
ly extending the protection of the Fourth Amendment. 4 In this view, the
conviction of Harris was possible only because the draft cards were found
-if the checks the agents had been looking for had been found, and a pros-
ecution had been based on them, a reversal of conviction would have been
necessary.
If there is such a limitation on the majority opinion, the minority did
not see it. Justices Frankfurter and Murphy wrote dissents in each of
which both theyand Mr. Justice Rutledge joined. The essential theory of
these dissents was that while under the rule of the earlier cases, limited
search might be made on arrest, this had not been such a search. Mr. Jus-
tice Jackson, dissenting, seemed to go farther and suggest that there
should be no search beyond the person of the individual arrested. The
opinions of Justices Frankfurter and Murphy were temperate, scholarly,
and, to this reader, completely convincing, while the Jackson position,
though more novel, has real force.
The fundamental issue in the recurrent right to counsel cases is whether
in state prosecutions a man may be deprived of right to counsel because
he is too poor to pay for a lawyer's help. Under the Sixth Amendment, all
persons must have counsel in federal cases if they desire it, without refer-
ence to their financial condition. Under the decision in Powell v. Ala-
bama,x"5 the states, too, must afford counsel in capital cases.
But in Bets v. Brady,"6 four years ago, a slightly different situation was
presented. There it was held that an ignorant man charged with robbery,
who pleaded for counsel which was denied him because he could not pay
for the help, had no right to counsel under the federal Constitution. The
decision was 5 to 3, and the rationale was that described earlier in this
discussion: that in noncapital cases, the right to counsel was not suffi-
ciently important or valuable to be required by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment in the absence of proof in the particular case that some special and
additional injustice had been done.
Belts v. Brady seemed destined for a quiet demise. From 1943 until the
last day of the term in June 1947, that decision was never cited by the
Supreme Court as controlling, and the decision of numerous cases gave
z4 Neuslein v. District of Columbia, z S F. 2d 69o (App. D.C., i94o).
"zS 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 116 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
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room for the hope that it had been abandoned.Y But in the case of Foster
v. Illinois,"," the Betts case was once again cited with approval. Justices
Reed, Frankfurter, and Jackson have not abandoned it, and Mr. Chief
Justice Vinson and Mr. Justice Burton have been won to its standard.
The remaining four justices dissented. In the Foster case the petitioners
had pleaded guilty to a charge of burglary and larceny in Illinois without
having been advised of a right to counsel. The majority opinion of Mr.
Justice Frankfurter found failure of proof that the lack of counsel had
harmed petitioners.
Accompanying the problem of substantive right in the fair trial cases is
the problem of the procedure for securing it. Here is a body of constitu-
tional law for the defense of those railroaded to the penitentiary. Such
persons frequently do not raise their claims until after the prison doors
shut. Counsel would have taken appeals; but the law of collateral attack
must be practiced by those who have no counsel. It follows that if the
Supreme Court establishes high-sounding rights and then creates or in-
sists upon awkward procedures for collateral attack, it will give with one
hand and take with the other. Most of the controversy in recent years has
been over procedure-to what court must the prisoner go to make his ap-
plication, for what writ shall he ask, etc. In some states, the release pro-
cedures are not a pathway, they are a maze; and the decisions unhappily
leave possibly guiltless men lying in prison cells as they vainly attempt to
work out the mysteries of habeas corpus, coram nobis, common law cer-
tiorari, and the many other procedural devices which torment the legal
system." 9 In the Gaye 20 and Carter 2 1 cases this year, the Court has sanc-
117 See De Meerleer v. Michigan, 67 S. Ct. 596, 597 (z947) and cases there cited. The real
problem in these cases is improving the standard of justice without thereby automatically
releasing the horde of prisoners who may have been convicted without counsel in those states
which do not require it. One compromise method which would reach the result would be theformulation of a rule in three parts: (a) In the absence of intelligent waiver, failure of the
state to provide counsel for the indigent is reversible error on direct appeal; (b) If counsel has
been requested and denied, the conviction should be set aside on collateral attack; (c) If
counsel was neither requested nor provided, conviction will be set aside only for special cir-
cumstances on collateral attack. Point (a) would largely remedy the situation for the future,
since the states could not afford to take chances on appeals; while point (c) would prevent a
general jail delivery.
I's 67 S. Ct. 716 (1947).
119 The horrible example is Hawk v. Olson, 326 U.S. 271 (1945). After some fifteen or more
court proceedings in the Nebraska Trial and Supreme Court and in all three levels of federal
courts, resulting in one intimation and one command by the Supreme Court that a hearing
be given, Hawk is still, so far as this writer knows, searching Nebraska procedure to find theproper form of remedy. See Hawk v. Olson, 66 F. Supp. z95 (Neb., 1946) for the account of
Nebraska's frustration of the Supreme Court mandate, and for Judge Delehant's patient ifindignant effort to find a solution. See for brief discussion of the problem of procedure, Note,
22 Ind. L. J. 262, 263 n. 9 (1947).
120 Gayes v. New York, 67 S. Ct. 1711 (1947). 121 Carter v. Illinois, 67 S. Ct. 216 (1946).
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tioned procedural clumsiness which hangs relief like fruit beyond the reach
of the hungry. -The Gayes case holds- that petitioner waived his right to
protest improper procedure at a time *hen he-probably did not know it
was his to waive, and when, under the New York law involved, he could
not have raised it;122 and in the Carier case the' Court found itself barred
from considering the entirety of petitioner's grievance because it was re-
stricted tothe "common law record," which contained nothing relevant to
his real complaint of denial of due process. "
Congress has an excellent opportunity to improve the procedural mud-
die at the present time. Section 2254 of the proposed revision of the Judi-
cial Code would give statutory status to the present rule that state rem-
edies must be exhausted before recourse can be had to federal courts in
habeas corpus proceedings. A simple amendment might insert the require-
ment that the state remedy be simple, speedy, and efficient if it is to de-
serve this priority.
In still another case affecting fairness of trials, the Court upheld the
blue-ribbon jury system in New York, at least as applied in the particular
case before it." 3
The principal religious freedom case was the New Jersey school bus
matter. 24 There the issue was whether a New Jersey township could reim-
burse parents for the cost of bus transportation to school where the allow-
ance was made not only for children attending public schools, but for
children attending Catholic schools. A taxpayer contended that the allow-
ance to Catholic parents was unconstitutional because it violated the
principles of separation of church and state.
The majority of five, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Black, saw the prob-
lem in terms of two polar concepts, to one of which the particular case
must be assigned. On the one hand, the Court believed that general social
welfare legislation could as properly be applied for the benefit of parochial
as for public students. Thus police protection could be given to students
at all schools and reduced bus fares might be required for all children re-
gardless of religion. On the other hand, direct aid to parochial schools
could not be permitted, the majority declaring that "New Jersey cannot
consistently with the 'establishment of religion' clause of the First Amend-
ment contribute tax-raised funds to the support of an institution which
-2 See cases collected, Gayes v. New York, 67 S. Ct. 1711 (1947), Rutledge dissent at
i715, The majority distinguishes those cases on various grounds, the first of which is that they
were decided "in courts of very limited authority." Ibid., at 1713.
23 Fay v. New York, 67 S . Ct. 1613 (1947). "Blue Ribbon" juries are discussed in Note,
47 Col. L. Rev. 463 (r947), and 6o Harv. L. Rev. 613 (1947).
124 Everson v. Bd, of Educ. of Ewing Tp., 67 S. Ct. 504 (1947).
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teaches the tenets and faith of any church."" 2s However, the majority con-
signed this particular case to the category of general welfare legislation.
The principal dissenting opinion, by Mr. Justice Rutledge joined by Jus-
tices Frankfurter, Jackson, and Burton, acknowledged that some general
services could be performed by the state for parochial schools, but felt
that this one was beyond the narrow limit of those proper services. Z26 Both
the majority opinion and the Rutledge dissent will serve as a useful store-,
house of historical information on the meaning of the Amendment.The dis-
sent conceded that precedent is with the majority; 27 and to this reader,
the majority reasoning is completely sound.
The opinions suggest certain general conclusions. The state can extend
various types of relief and welfare measures to all children and parents,
regardless of whether the children attend parochial or public school. Here
free transportation was approved. Presumably free textbooks or free
morning milk and crackers for all poor children, or free vaccinations given
all school children would still be approved. On the other hand, no appro-
priations may be made for buildings, grounds, or teachers' salaries in paro-
chial schools, and this would presumably preclude reaching the same re-
sult either by direct appropriation or by rebate to taxpayers. It would
seem to follow from both the majority and the minority opinions that the
use of public school buildings for any type of religious education would be
precluded as direct aid.12
With the exception of two cases concerning free speech, the remaining
civil rights cases were either minor or so unique as to be of no recurrent
interest."2 In the Hatch Act cases, 30 the problem was whether Congress
h Ibid., at 512.
116 Mr. Justice Jackson filed a separate dissent emphasizing that the ordinance provided
for children in public and Catholic schools, but made no mention of children attending other
private schools. Ibid., at 513-14. This apparently raised equal protection doubts for him.
The majority had no similar difficulty because so far as the record showed there were no other
schools in the township, and hence the ordinance quite possibly was comprehensive. Ibid.,
at 506.
127 Cochran v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 U.S. 370 (i93o) permitted free distribution
of textbooks to all children including those in parochial schools.
128 This thesis will be tested in Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., pending as No. go
for the October term, 1947. The problem of "Public Flunds for Sectarian Schools" is discussed
in Note, 6o Harv. L. Rev. 793 (i947).
129 Treason was further defined in Haupt v. United States, 67 S. Ct. 874 (1947). The Seventh
Amendment continued its return to vitality in two cases confirming the prerogatives of the
civil jury. Ellis v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., 67 S. Ct. 598 (i947) and Myers v. Reading Co., 67
S. Ct. 1334 (1947). The cruel and unusual punishment and double jeopardy provisions were
reviewed in an unusual case in which the petitioner alleged infringement of his rights under
these clauses. He complained that the Louisiana electric chair, to which he had been con-
-[Footnotes 129 and x3o continued on following page]
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can, as a condition of federal employment or of a grant in aid, control the
political activities of federal employees or of state employees at least par-
tially receiving federal funds. The Act forbids employees to "take any ac-
tive part in political management or political campaigns."z31 The Act and
the regulations permit the employees to vote as they choose and to ex-
press political opinions; but those opinions cannot be expressed in speeches
at party gatherings, nor can they be made effective by party work. It was
challenged in two cases, one by a federal employee, Poole, and one by a
state employee, Paris. Poole, an industrial worker in the United States
Mint, was a ward executive committeeman, worked at the polls on elec-
tion day, and was party paymaster for other election workers. Paris was
Oklahoma State Democratic Chairman and a member of the state high-
way commission. His principal offense was helping to organize a party
"Victory Dinner" and introducing the toastmaster on that occasion.
Mr. Justice Reed for the Court upheld the Act over the dissent on the
merits of Justices Black and Rutledge, and the partial dissent of Mr. Jus-
tice Douglas. Justices Jackson and Murphy did not participate and the
decision was thus in part 4 to 3, and in part 5 to 2.
With two possible paths to decision, Mr. Justice Reed chose the one
which gave at least some constitutional protection to Government em-
ployees. The Court denied that Government employees were totally de-
void of rights, saying that it would interfere to invalidate congressional
legislation "when such regulation passes beyond the general existing con-
ception of governmental power. ' ' 132 At the same time it held that this was
not such a regulation.
The Court did not approach the problem specifically in terms of the
clear and present danger found in each specific act which Poole and Paris
had performed. Instead it balanced generally a congressional desire for a
good and efficient civil service against the general activities of the em-
ployees. There was none of the usual effort in free speech cases to consider
demned, failed to work the first time because of defective wiring, and that he could not be
returned to it. Mr. Justice Reed, for a 5 to 4 majority, held that the Constitution did not pro-
tect against such an accident. The case was so clearly unique that it is puzzling to imagine on
what ground certiorari was granted. Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 67 S. Ct. 374
(1947).
110 67 S. Ct. 544 (I947) and 67 S. Ct. 556 (1947).
'315.3 Stat. 1148 (1939), i8 U.S.C.A. § 61h (x939).
S32Mr. Justice Reed also said, "Appellants urge that federal employees are protected by
the Bill of Rights, and that Congress may not'enact a regulation providing that no Republican,
Jew, or Negro shall be appointed to federal office, or that no federal employee shall attend
Mass or take any active part in missionary work.' None would deny such limitations .... 67 S. Ct. 556, 569 (1947).
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whether in fact there really was so serious a menace to society as to war-
rant the restraint on the liberty. Yet as Mr. Justice Holmes had shown in
dealing with the Espionage Act of 1917, a statute limiting free speech
must prove its justification in each application.133 Here it was not shown
that Paris' introduction of a toastmaster or Poole's service as ward com-
mitteeman did the slightest bit of "danger to any interest which Congress
has the right to protect," much less a "dear and present" danger. On the
other hand, it may be that a general evil of possible damage to the civil
service must be dealt with generally, rather than case by case. 34
The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Black cast a different balance.
To him the practical exclusion of 3,ooo,ooo Americans from participation
in the political life of the community was a far more serious evil than any
which Congress had sought to rectify. Mr. Justice Rutledge shared this
view, and Mr. Justice Douglas sought to split the difference by upholding
the Act as to some Government employees but not as to industrial work-
ers like Poole.
In the contempt case of Craig v. Harney, 35 the Court took a different
approach. There the issue was whether a Texas court could punish the
publisher and certain employees of a newspaper for contempt for comment-
ing critically, and indeed, unfairly, upon the judge's handling of a trial.
The Court, in holding that the particular activity could not be so pun-
ished, did not hold that there was no contempt power ever available to
protect courts against publications which would be "a serious and immi-
nent threat to the administration of justice."'.3 But Mr. Justice Douglas,
in the majority opinion, analyzed the articles to determine whether in fact
they met the constitutional measure: "The fires which it kindles must con-
stitute an imminent, not merely a likely, threat to the administration of
justice. The danger must not be remote or even probable; it must immedi-
ately imperil." .' 37 He then concluded that these publications met no such
test. The Chief Justice joined in a dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice
Frankfurter, and Mr. Justice Jackson also dissented.
133 See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) and Abrams v. United States, 25o
U.S. 616, 624 (1919).
'34 The Hatch Act cases are analyzed in terms of the "clear and present danger" theory
in Note, 22 Ind. L. J. 246, 249 -5I(1947). The statement of the problem is clear, but unhappily
the author does not explain the reason for his own seeming acquiescence in the proposition
that the clear and present danger test is inapplicable. For further comment see Note, Political
Sterilization of Government Employees, 47 Col. L. Rev. 295 (1947); Mosher, Government
Employees under the Hatch Act, 22 N.Y.U.L.Q. 232 (1947), and, on the clear and present
danger problem, Ibid., at 251.
3s 67 S. Ct. 1249 (1947).
x36 Ibid., at 1253. 137 Ibid., at 1255.
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Here is a fundamental difference in approach. In the Craig case, the
Court studied every utterance to determine whether there was "an im-
minent, not merely a likely" threat to the public welfare. In the Hatch
Act cases, it was enough that Congress might reasonably have feared "the
cumulative effect on employee morale of political activity" without any
reference to the facts at hand. The cases leave this puzzling problem:
Are we on the verge of a division of theory in free speech cases, in which
some kinds of activity may be limited because it is convenient and desir-
able to do so, while other kinds of activity may be limited only on clear
and present danger rationale? Or are the Hatch Act cases merely a theo-
retical deviation in conformity with a tradition of some qualification of
the rights of Government employees for the good of the service?3 8 The
solution may come when those provisions of the new labor bill limiting
political activities of unions come before the Court. 39
IV. LAWYER'S LAW
FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE
As usual, the Court had before it in the 1946 term a substantial number
of cases involving jurisdiction and procedure in all federal courts. At
least a half dozen of these cases deserve and will receive separate treat-
ment by many authors in many law reviews. It is difficult to do more
than enumerate them here.
Perhaps the most interesting and probably the most difficult problem
in federal jurisdiction was Angel v. Bullingtdn.140 Bullington, a Virginia
citizen, sold Virginia land to Angel, a North Carolinian, for cash and notes
secured by the land in Virginia. Upon non-payment of the notes, the land
was sold and a deficiency resulted. Thereupon Bullington brought an ac-
tion for a deficiency judgment in the face of a North Carolina state statute
which provided that such persons "shall not be entitled to a deficiency
judgment." The statute may appear to be substantive, but the North
Carolina court in Bullington's case held that it +vas "jurisdictional.'"
In fairly plain language, the North Carolina court suggested that, while
the statute closed the North Carolina courts, it did not close the fed-
eral courts, and that Bullington might well bring the same action in the
federal district court. Bullington took the tip, did not appeal the North
z3S As, for example, Ex parte Curtis, io6 U.S. 371 (1882).
139 Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, § 304, 29 U.S.C.A. §25T (Supp., 1947).
140 67 S. Ct. 657 (1947).
14X Bullington v. Angel, 22o N.C. x8, 16 S.E. 2d 411 (1941).
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Carolina decision to the United States Supreme Court, and brought a
second action in the federal district court.
This second action in due course came to the United States Supreme
Court, which after argument and reargument decided this term that
Bullington's failure to appeal the judgment denying the jurisdiction of the
North Carolina courts was fatal; that the first judgment was res ad-
judicata; that the merits of his claim were so locked with the jurisdictional
issue that the decision on the latter included the former; and that under
Erie v. TomipkiS 42 principles, the federal district court was bound by
the same "jurisdictional" decision as the state courts, and could give no
more relief than the state courts.
In the circumstances, the North Carolina decision, which carefully
rested not on the merits but on a deficiency in the jurisdiction of the
North Carolina courts, should not preclude action in another court
whose jurisdiction is unquestioned. To this view the majority responded,
in effect, that the issue on the merits and the issue on jurisdiction were
identical; that is to say that Bullington must show the North Carolina
statute to be unconstitutional to recover, and if it is unconstitutional, it
is unconstitutional construed either as a substantive rule of law or as a
limitation on jurisdiction. Of course, the North Carolina court obviously
had no such conception and had not decided the constitutional point.
To this the majority replied that the issue was necessarily decided whether
the North Carolina court thought so or not.
The reference to Erie v. Tompkins is in point in the majority opinion
because, essentially, the majority is, without saying so, devising a
principle for the limitation of diversity jurisdiction by permitting state
legislatures to limit federal jurisdiction.': 4 As Mr. Justice Reed in dissent
said, this "departs from controlling precedents that state enactments on
jurisdiction, remedies and procedures do not affect the jurisdiction, reme-
dies, or procedures of federal courts."' 44
In other cases this term, the Court materially expanded the scope of
the doctrine of forum non conveniens, and thereby read a new and severe
limitation into the federal venue statute. 4s In one case it held that the
doctrine permitted a federal district court in New York, plaintiff's
domicil, to refuse to consider a policyholder's derivative action against an
X42 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
'43 See the dissenting opinion of Mr. justice Frankfurter, Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 3i9 U.S.
315, 337 (1943).
'44 Angel v. Bullington, 67 S. Ct. 657, 665 (i947).
'4536 Stat. IIOI (1911), 28 U.S.C.A. § 112 (igui).
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Illinois mutual insurance company and its officer, where plaintiff's case
was to be made largely out of materials in the hands of the defendants.1
46
In a second and more startling case, the Court relinquished the applica-
tion of this doctrine in the field of equity. It held that a federal district
court in New York might decline to hear the case of a Virginia plaintiff
suing a Pennsylvania corporation doing business in New York where the
suit was brought on a tort claim arising in Virginia.147 The plaintiff's domi-
nant reason for preferring New York was apparently the belief that he
was more likely to receive a sizable verdict there than in Lynchburg,
Virginia. Mr. Justice Jackson wrote the majority opinion, and Justices
Black, Reed, Rutledge, and Burton dissented in opinions by Black and
Reed.
The difficult issues raised in these cases cannot be adequately discussed
here, but the compromise chosen by th6 Court is an unfortunate practical
solution. Either rigid application of the broad federal venue statute, giv-
ing the plaintiff great latitude in selecting the place of suit, or a sharp
legislative amendment taking away the plaintiff's prerogatives would
appear to be better than reducing the matter to question of discretion.
The doctrine permits the intrusion into many suits of a time-consuming
issue, irrelevant to the decision on the merits which may be time consum-
ing enough. If, as the dissent fears, the new doctrine will permit suits to
be dismissed on this ground when the statute of limitations has run be-
tween the time of filing the suit and the time of the dismissal, then serious
injustice will result. However, the decision in Hillsborough Township v.
Cromwell"48 in 1945 on a functionally related problem is an indication that
where the statute of limitations has run, the expanded forum non con-
veniens doctrine will not be applied.149
Of the several procedural cases, the most noteworthy was Hickman v.
Taylor.50 The issue was whether, under the Federal Rules, one party
might inquire into the statements of witnesses collected by counsel for
opposing party. Rule 26 (b) permits the taking of depositions in "any
matter, not privileged." The Court held that the particular matter was
not privileged. However, Mr. Justice Murphy stated for the Court that
X46 Koster v. Lumberman's Mutual Co., 67 S. Ct. 828 (1947).
147 Gulf Oil Co. v. Gilbert, 67 S. Ct. 839 (1947).
148 326 U.S. 620 (1946).
149 The danger of the running of the statute of limitations because of the shift of district
will be avoided if the proposed revision of the Judicial Code is adopted, since the revision pro-
vides for transfer of actions from one district to another. Note, The Proposed Revision of the
Federal Judicial Code, 6o Harv. L. Rev. 424, 435 (1947).
is* 67 S. Ct. 38s (1947).
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"all the files and mental processes of lawyers" were not "thereby opened
to the free scrutiny of their adversaries" by Rule 26.Y '
In dealing with its own procedure, the Court several times considered
the use of its discretionary power to decide cases or to postpone judgment.
There are many occasions when a technicality will avoid a decision on
the ultimate issue. Among other values, delay serves to avoid decision
before judges can make up their minds.
But delay should not be a habit, for litigants, too, have rights. The
Supreme Court is not a disembodied God for whose convenience lawyers
and clients were created to provide it with Great Problems. It has a dual
function of making policy while it serves as a convenience for parties. S2
Hickman v. Taylor, as compared with several other cases, provides a
contrast. In the Hickman case, the Court discovered that the petitioner
had proceeded under the wrong rule of Civil Procedure. The Court said,
"Under the circumstances we deem it unnecessary and unwise to rest our
decision upon this procedural irregularity, an irregularity which is not
strongly urged upon us and which was disregarded in the two courts be-
low." Z' s3 This attitude of desire to get the main matter decided and done
with may be compared with the following cases:
The Alma Motor Co. case,'s which the parties and the court below had
innocently thought involved the constitutionality of the Royalty Adjust-
ment Act of 1942. The case was argued in 1945 and reargued in 1946.
Not until the reargument did the Government suggest that the decision
might have been based upon a nonconstitutional question, and the case
was remanded for its consideration.
The case of Ballard v. United States"s5 came to the Court for the second
time in 1946. The defendants had been indicted for using the mails to de-
fraud in the course of religious activities. Suffice it to say that the case had
gone from the district court to the circuit court of appeals to the Supreme
Court and back to the circuit court upon reversal and remand. It returned
1s5 It is rumored that in response to this decision some insurance companies are making all
their investigators into "counsel" to keep their reports confidential. If true, the device fails
to appreciate the care with which the decision was rested not on formal "privilege," but on
genuine professional tradition. Ibid., at 394-95. For a more complete discussion, see Recent
Cases, 14 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 497 (x947).
1S2 The primary reason for the prolonged congressional resistance to the abolition of cir-
cuit riding for Supreme Court justices stemmed from fear that isolation in Washington
might give delusions of grandeur and destroy the common touch. See 2 Warren, The Supreme
Court in United States History 133-35 (1923).
XS3 Hickman v. Taylor, 67 S. Ct. 385, 391 (1947).
's4 Alma Motor Co. v. Timken-Detroit Axle Co., 67 S. Ct. 231 (1946).
"S 67 S. Ct. 261 (1946), previously before the Court in 322 U.S. 78 (I944).
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to the Supreme Court at this term. The Court reversed because it was
called to its attention for the first time that women had been systematical-
ly excluded from the grand and petit juries in California at the time of
the original indictment and trial. The indictment was ordered dismissed.
In neither the first appearance of the case in the Supreme Court nor
in the second was the majority willing or able to decide the basic issue
in the case, whether the First Amendment gave the defendants constitu-
tional protection for their activities. In this case the majority declined to
discuss the point since the defendants might never again be indicted or
convicted.
In the Gospel Army1s6 and in the Rescue Army s7 cases, the issue was
the validity of an elaborate set of Los Angeles regulations applicable to
solicitors for charity. The two "Armies" contended that the regulations
were unconstitutional interferences with religious liberty. The Rescue
Army case arose on a writ of prohibition filed by one Murdock and the
Rescue Army in an appropriate state court on the ground that Murdock
had twice before been arrested and convicted for violating these municipal
regulations. Under California law this is an appropriate way to test the
constitutional issues involved. The California Supreme Court decided
against Murdock and the Rescue Army on the merits, and on October 28,
1946, the Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction. On June 9, i947,
Mr. Justice Rutledge for the Court held that the appeal could not be con-
sidered at this time since the resolution of certain ambiguities in the
statute in some other state proceeding might result in avoidance of some
constitutional issues. The Gospel Army case had also come up, and it was
dismissed on the ground that the judgment of the California Supreme
Court, in that case only, had not been "final."
In the Rescue Army case, the judgment was unquestionably "final."
One may doubt, therefore, whether the Court had discretion not to hear
the matter, since it came up on appeal rather than on certiorari, and the
essential practical difference between the two is that the Court lacks
discretion as to the former while it may deny the latter.
Mr. Justice Black concurred in the result. Justices Douglas and Murphy
dissented on the grounds that the time had come for the Court to decide
the merits. And Murdock went away with no decision to face a third con-
viction in the Los Angeles Municipal Court, and with the prospect of
financing, if he or his organization can, another trip through the Cali-
fornia court system to the United States Supreme Court.
On the last day of the term, the case of Winters v. New Yorkls8 was set
1s6 Gospel Army v. Los Angeles, 67 S. Ct. 1428 (1947).
Is7 Rescue Army v. Los Angeles, 67 S. Ct. 1409 (1947). s8 67 S. Ct. 1747 (1947).
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
down for its second reargument, its third argument, in the Supreme Court.
The issue was the validity of a New York obscenity statute applied in a
criminal prosecution to a magazine peddler.
It is not the purpose of these paragraphs to assert that undesirable
action was taken in any of these four cases. s9 The basic issues in all could
have been decided if the Court had wanted to decide them. Nothing but
pure discretion forced these delays. In each, litigants were put to great
costs in time or money because the Court did not choose to decide. On
the face of them, all should have been decided on their fundamental
issues. But of course no outside observer can know what conference
room tensions or indecisions make it propitious to delay decision until
another year.
coNiXr~CT OrF LAWS
There were several important conflicts decisions this year. They are
enumerated in the note and cannot be discussed here. 6° The most inter-
esting from a general standpoint was Industrial Commission v. McCartin,'6 '
which so sharply limited Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt to its facts as to
come close to overruling it.'62 As limited here, the Hunt decision would
appear to be inapplicable to anything but the Texas statute from which
it arose. The scope of this year's conflict of laws decisions requires an
article on Full Faith and Credit at the 1946 Term.163
V. THE INSTITUTION AND ITS JUSTICES
= WORK OF TE INSTITUTION
The Court handed down 142 opinions this year, not a large number. 64
Of these, about 40 per cent, a strikingly large proportion, were written
159 Or in United States v. Petrillo, 67 S. Ct. 1538 (1947), a more limited example of post-
ponement. There are of course some cases in which reargument is most appropriate. Foremost
among them is Gayes v. New York, 67 S. Ct. 1711 (i947), in which the majority rested its
decision on a point of New York procedural law which had not been argued by the unusually
competent counsel handling the case. A petition for rehearing by Gayes indicates fairly clearly
that the Court was in error on its surprise point of New York procedure. That petition had
not been acted upon at the time of writing this article. The incident suggests that where the
Court believes that an unargued point of local law is decisive and competent local counsel are
available for research, the Court should at least receive new briefs before decision.
'6o The principal conflicts cases were Morris v. Jones, 67- S. Ct. 451 (1947); New York ex
rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 67 S. Ct. 903 (1947); Cope v. Anderson, 67 S. Ct. 1340 (x947); United
Commercial Travellers v. Wolfe, 67 S. Ct. 1355 (1947); Industrial Commission v. McCartin,
67 S. Ct. 886 (1947).
x
6 Ibid.
16 The Magnolia case is reported at 320 U.S. 430 (1943). Professor C. Ben Dutton com-
ments that the McCartin case may indicate that the Magnolia rule "is to be sharply limited
and perhaps indirectly overruled for it attributes to the Magnolia case a finding that that case
did not necessarily embrace." 22 1nd. L. J. 201, 211 (1947).
163 Such an article by Professor Fowler Harper appears in 47 Col. L. Rev. 883 (1947).
164 There are likely to be some divergencies in statements as to the number of opinions
because of differences in appraising related cases as one or two opinions. The figure 142 is
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by Justices Black and Douglas. Justices Black, Douglas and Murphy to-
gether wrote 52 per cent of the opinions of the Court."6s This does not
mean that- the other justices did not do a great deal of serious work;
for example, Mr. Justice Rutledge's concurring opinion in Freeman v.
Hewit and his dissenting opinions in the New Jersey school bus and the
LeWs cases represent enormous effort, and Mr. Justice Reed's Hatch
Act opinions represent more work than a less significant case. It was
Mr. Chief Justice Vinson's first year, and it seems virtually certain that
he will carry his full load hereafter. Nonetheless, a few shoulders bore an
overlarge share of the common burden.
Though they wrote over half the opinions, Justices Black, Douglas,
and Murphy did not dominate the thinking of the Court. To appreciate
the weight of particular men or particular philosophies in the Court, it is
necessary to concentrate on the most important cases. For the sake of the
taken from the Washington Star (June 29, 1947). The U.S. Law Week figure is x43. i6
U.S. L. Week 3019 (1947). There had been 136 opinions in the October Term, 1945, during
which Mr. Justice Jackson was absent, and Mr. Chief Justice Stone died; and there were
162 opinions in the October Term, 1944. 14 U.S. L. Week 3443 (1946).
I6s The following table is taken from the Washington Star (June 29, 1947):
Justice o tnen corn- Dissent Total
Court ring
Vinson .............................. 13 o a 13
Black .............................. 29 2 7 38
Reed ............................... 14 I 9 24
Frankfurter ......................... 12 310 1 40*
Douglas .......................... .27 1 9 37
Murphy .......................... . 7 I rI 29Jackson ............................. 15 4 12 31
Rutledge ........................... 9 10 X3 32
Bu .ton ............................ 6 o 2
Totals .......................... 142 29 78 252
* Justice Frankfurter also wrote three separate opinions, dissenting in part and con-
curring in part.
The following table shows number of pages written and is taken from the Washington
Post, p. 6b, col. 5 (Aug. 1o, 1947). The Post quite properly adds, "for what it's worth."
Justice Opinions Dissents ConcurringDisns Opinions Total
Douglas ......................... 31o 50 8 368
Rutldge ....................... 283 IIr 41 335
Frankfurter... 87 1S5 57 329
Black ........................ 235 51 4 290
Murphy ........................ 217 59 2 278
Court Avg ..................... 292 67 r 4 273
Jackson ......................... 16S 49 12 226
Reed .......................... 185 35 4 224
Burton .......................... 159 62 0 221
Vinson .......................... go 0 I 9o
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
following analyses, I have, obviously arbitrarily, picked two groups of
cases. The first is the group of eight cases which seem to be the most sig-
nificant decisions of the year, the cases which may go unnoticed by the
general public, but which deserve the attention of every citizen. 6 6 The
second group, twenty-nine in number, are the cases which, though less im-
portant, are far from routine 167 They are the cases which deserve the
careful attention not only of lawyers but of economists and political
scientists. The other io5 cases are those which are of less importance or
which admitted of only one likely decision, even though a contrary
decision would have made the case of general public interest. 68
The data in Table 2 are taken from the eight, or "major," cases, and
the twenty-nine, or "important," cases. Disqualifications give some
justices less than thirty-seven cases.
The distribution of agreements among some of the justices, excluding
unanimous opinions, was as shown in Table 3.
x66 Adamson v. California, 67 S. Ct. 1672 (1947); California v. United States, 67 S. Ct. i658
('947); Foster v. Illinois, 67 S. Ct. 1716 (I947); Freeman v. Hewit, 67 S. Ct. 274 (1946);
Hatch Act cases, 67 S. Ct. 556 (1947) and 67 S. Ct. 544 (1947); Lewis case, 67 S. Ct. 677
(1947); New York v. United States, 67 S. Ct. 1207 (1947).
167 American Power & S. v. SEC, 67 S. Ct. 133 (1946); Richfield Oil Corp. v. State Board of
Equalization, 67 S. Ct. i56 (1946); Carter v. Illinois, 67 S. Ct. 216 (x946); Gibson v. United
States, 67 S. Ct. 301 (946); International Harvester v. Evatt, 67 S. Ct. 444 (1947); Katzinger
Co. v. Chicago Metallic Co., 67 S. Ct. 421 (I947); MacGregor v. Westinghouse Electric
Co., 67 S. Ct. 424 (i947); Hickman v. Taylor, 67 S. Ct. 385 (i947); Transparent-Wrap
Mach. Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co., 67 S. Ct. 61o (i947); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 67 S. Ct.
504 (1947); Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB,.67 S. Ct. 789 (1947); United Brotherhood v.
United States, 67 S. Ct. 775 (1947); Joseph v. Carter & Weekes Co., 67 S. Ct. 8r 5 (i947);
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 67 S. Ct. 839 (I947); Kosterman v. Lumbermen's Mutual Co.,
67 S. Ct. 828 (1947); Industrial Commission v. McCartin, 67 S. Ct. 886 (947); Kotch v. Bd.
of River Com'rs, 67 S. Ct. 910 (1947); Penfield Co. v. SEC, 67 S. Ct. 918 (x947); Bruce's
Juices v. American Can Co., 67 S. Ct. oI05 (947); Walling v. Halliburton Oil Well Co., 67
S. Ct. io56 (1947); Independent Warehouses v. Scheele, 67 S. Ct. io62 (947); Craig v. Harney,
67 S. Ct. 1249 (1947); Greenough v. Tax Assessors, 67 S. Ct. 1400 (1947); Williams v. Austrian,
67 S. Ct. 1443 (1947); United States v. National Lead Co., 67 S. Ct. 1634 (i947); United
States v. Standard Oil Co., 67 S. Ct. 16o4 (i947); Fay v. New York, 67 S. Ct. 1613 (i947);
Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Phillips, 67 S. Ct. 1584 (I947); Gayes v. New York, 67 S. Ct.
17XI (947); United States v. Petrillo, 67 S. Ct. 1538 (i947).
Obviously, reasonable people might delete some of these cases or add others. The choice is
concededly arbitrary.
16 8 For example, Testa v. Katt, 67 S. Ct. 81o (947) would have been an extraordinarily
important case if it had held that states did not have to enforce federal regulatory acts; and
Fleming v. Mohawk Wrecking & Lumber Co., 67 S. Ct. 1129 (1947) would have been impor-
tant if it had held that the Price Control Administrator did have to sign every subpoena
personally.
z169 This simplicity is a little delusive, but greater precision would be unmanageable. For
example, the disagreement among the major cases between Justices Black and Douglas was
their partial disagreement on the Hatch Act. The "agreement" in the Lewis case between
Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Frankfurter vas the agreement in one part of the result
only and none of the theory. The consistent Vinson-Reed-Burton position in the majority
makes it unnecessary to classify their agreements. The following two tables of agreement and
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The tabular data demonstrate that, for the practical purpose of decid-
ing cases, the decisive element -in the Supreme Court today is the group of
TABLE 2
VOTING DISTRIBUTION
MAJORITY VOTES DissENTiNG VOTES
Major Impor- Total Major Total
tant tant
Vinson ............ 8 24 32 0 5 5
Black ............. 4 18 22 4 10 14
Reed .............. 7 24 31 1 5 6
Frankfurter ........ . 5 22 27 3 7 10
Douglas ........... 5 20 25 3 8 iI
Murphy ........... 2 19 21 5 10 15
Jackson ........... 4 20 24 2 8 iO
Rutledge .......... 3 16 19 5 13 18
Burton ............ 8 21 29 0 8 8
Vinson, Reed, and Burton. In the eight major cases, the Chief Justice
and Mr. Justice Burton were never in dissent, and Mr. Justice Reed was
disagreement in all cases rather than in those selected for importance are taken from an
article on the Court by Dillard Stokesin the Washington Post, p. 6B (Aug. 17, 1947):
TABLE I
PERCENTAGE or AOREEwExET AMONG JUSTICES IN CASES DECIDED
AT OCTOBER TERam, 1946, BY A DIVIDED COURT
Frank- Black Douglas Murphy ledgeVinson Reed Burton Jaeckson furterldg
Vinson ........................ 75 74 71 70 56 32 5 47
Reed ................. 75 ........ 73 67 6o 55 52 41 53
Burton ................. 74 7.3 ....... 6i 6i 48 52 39 5o
a ckson ............... 7 67 x .... I... 75 41 37 37
Frankfurter ............ 70 6o 61 75 ........ 39 38 30 38
Black................. 6 55 48 41 39 66 74 69
Douglas. .............. 52 2 52 37 38 66""".. . 67 54
Murphy ................ 51 41 39 36 30 74 67 "..9"'" 69
Rutledge ............... 47 55 50 38 38 69 54 9 ........
TABLE II
UsmBER O Tnims EACH JUSTICE AGREED WITH EACH OThER JUSTICE
An entry under the Justice' s own name shows the number of times he dissented alone.
Times Frank-
in Vinson Reed Burton Jackson furter Black Douglas Murphy 
Rut-
Dissent 
ledge
Vinson ........ .3 0 1 5 6 8 1 2 2 2
Reed .......... .S 1 0 7 6 6 3 4 2 7
Burton .......... 23 3 7 2 8 9~ 4 6 1
Jackson....... 26 6 6 8 3 6 1 1 3 4
Frankfurter.... 31 8 6 9 x6 2 1 4 3 6
Black....... 29 1 3 4 * 1 1 i5 21 21
Douglas:.... 33 2 4 6 x 4 is 2 22 17
Murphy....... 39 2 2 I 3 3 21 22 3 25
Rutledge. 43 2 7 9 4 6 21 17 25 2
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in dissent only once. In all of these cases, the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice
Reed were in dissent only five and six times respectively. In most of the
nonunanimous significant cases, the Court splits along fairly well definable
lines, and the group which wins the three in the middle carries the decision.
Next most influential in the important matters are Justices Frankfurter
and Jackson. Theirs was nearly the highest proportion of agreement of
any of the Justices other than the three central figures, and they won the
support of Justices Vinson, Reed, and Burton markedly more often than
did Justices Black, Douglas, Murphy, and Rutledge. Thus in these cases
Mr. Justice Frankfurter prevailed in five cases more than did Mr. Justice
TABLE 3
AGREEMENTS AMONG JUSTICES
Justices Major Important Total
Black-Douglas ............. 7 (of 8) i4 (of 21) 21 (of 29)
Murphy-Rutledge .......... 6 (of 7) 18 (of 23) 24 (of 30)
Black, Douglas, Murphy,
Rutledge ................ 4 (of 7) 12 (of 21) i6 (of 28)
Frankfurter-Jackson ........ 6 (of 6) 6 (Of 22) 22 (Of 28)
Black-Frankfurter .......... i (of 8) 5 (of 22) 6 (of 3o)
Black-Jackson ............. i (of 6) 3 (of 21) 4 (of 27)
Black, while Mr. Justice Black dissented in four cases more than did
Mr. Justice Frankfurter. This is particularly obvious with reference to
the types of cases-as has been seen, this year Justices Frankfurter and
Jackson very largely carried the day for their own views of civil rights
and of the commerce clause.
Last place for influence goes to Mr. Justice Rutledge, who was in the
majority in nineteen cases and in dissent in eighteen. In volume of dis-
sents, the order was Rutledge, Murphy, Black, and Douglas.
WORK OF IMNIDUAL JUSTICES
The 1946 term was Mr. Chief Justice Vinson's first.17 He assumed his
duties with all the calm poise produced by years as both a conciliator and
170 The new Chief Justice wrote the following opinions in his first year: Alma Motor Co. v.
Timken-Detroit Axle Co., 67 S. Ct. 231 (x946); Crane v. Com'r of Internal Revenue, 67 S. Ct.
1049 (1947); Interstate Natural Gas Co. v. Federal Power Com'n, 67 S. Ct. 2482 (i947); Harris
v. United States, 67 S. Ct. io98 (1947); Lewis case, 67 S. Ct. 677 (i947); McWilliams v. Com'r
of Internal Revenue, 67 S. Ct. 1477 (i947); i49 Madison Ave. Corp. v. Asselta, 67 S. Ct. 178
(i947); United States v. Alcea Band of Tillamook Indians, 67 S. Ct. 267 (2946); United States
v. Wyoming, 67 S. Ct. 2319 (2947); Unemployment Compensation Com'n v. Aragon, 67
S. Ct. 245 (1946); Walling v. Halliburton Oil Well Co., 67 S. Ct. io6 (1947); Williams v.
Austrian, 67 S. Ct. 1443 (i947).
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an arbiter of great events. His assignments of opinions were fair. His af-
fection for his brethren is obvious. He wrote no dissents, and when he
spoke for the majority, he spoke with a cool voice. For whatever reasons,
the year was largely unruffled.' 7 '
The new Chief Justice's philosophy appears to be strongly conservative.
This was particularly evident in the civil rights field. In the divided cases,
Vinson was the only Justice never to uphold a claimed civil right. Here
there was no variety to his tone. He saw nothing wrong in it that a man
should have his house ransacked by the police without a search warrant;
that a man should be forced to trial without counsel because of the state
of his purse;Y72 that a man should be forced to incriminate himself .73 In
the civil rights field his philosophy is radically different from the late Chief
Justice Stone, and since some of the most important advances in that field
in recent years depended on Stone's vote, 74 the clock may go back when
the issues arise again. There is unlikely ever to be a Gobitis dissent from
the new Chief Justice.'7s
Mr. Chief Justice Vinson in q946 accepted completely the new Frank-
furter theory of the state taxing power, and indeed pushed even further
to occupy with Mr. Justice Jackson the most extreme anti-state rights posi-
tion seen for years."6 He showed himself a moderate apostle of the anti-
trust laws."7
As a technician, Mr. Chief Justice Vinson was short and clear. He still
has something of the legislator's tendency to make the case easier than it
is by either ignoring or burying the opposition; in the Lewis case he
ignored controlling precedents;"78 in the search and seizure case he
skimmed by them ;79 and in the Tillamook Indian case he put most of the
"'1There were, however, 24o dissenting votes, more than in any year since 1941 when
current Law Week statistics begin. 16 U.S. L. Week 3019 (1947).
172Foster v. Illinois, 67 S. Ct. 1716 (1947).
'73 Adamson v. California, 67 S. Ct. 1672 (1947).
'74 See for example Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. IO5 (1943); Martin v. Struthers,
319 U.S. 141 (1943).
X7S In Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), the first flag-salute case.
Stone's magnificent one-man dissent started the road to reversal in West Virginia State Bd.
of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (i943).
" 0 Freeman v. Hewit, 67 S. Ct. 274 (1946) and Independent Warehouses v. Scheele,
67 S. Ct. io62 (i947).
77See the Katzinger-MacGregor patent cases, 67 S. Ct. 421 (I947) and 67 S. Ct. 424
(I947); cf. the National Lead case, 67 S. Ct. 1634 (1947) and Bruce's Juices, 67 S. Ct.
101 5 (1947).
"
5 See previous discussion of the Shipp theory, I5 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 5 (1947).
179 Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931), and United States v.
Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932) received scant treatment.
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issues into a footnote. x' ° At the same time he shows a free mind, not over-
awed by precedent. He upheld the Belo rule as precedent,'5 ' but where
vested rights had not accrued, he overruled.'52 His opinions in an unem-
ployment compensation matter 83 and on a point of federal jurisdiction
and procedure5 4 were technically as satisfying as any work need be, pre-
cisely and carefully done.
For Mr. Justice Black, as has been shown, it was a year of more work
than reward. But the year was not wholly without compensation. The
new Chief Justice assigned him almost his first patent cases,' 85 in which he
has a clear philosophy. Of the thirty-seven cases listed as most important,
he wrote the opinions in six, and of these the California oil case was the
most significant'
x86
The principal question asked about Mr. Justice Black by close followers
of the Court at the end of the 1946 term is, did Black himself shift with
the changing tides and sentiments of the year? The argument that he did
view some questions differently than might have been the case, say, six
years ago is based upon his decisions in the Lewis case, the Louisiana pilots
case, the New Jersey school bus case, the search and seizure case, and the
wage-hour railroad trainee cases.18 7 The entire remainder of his work-
the constitutional tax cases, the antitrust cases, the patent cases, the right
to counsel cases, and the free speech cases-were unquestionably con-
ISO United States v. Alcea Band of Tillamook Indian, 67 S. Ct. 167, 170 (1946).
181 Walling v. Halliburton Oil Well Co., 67 S. Ct. io56 (1947).
X& The Lewis opinion apparently overrules subsilentio the group of cases previously dis-
cussed; Harris v. United States may have overruled the cases cited in note ii supra; and
Williams v. Austrian, 67 S. Ct. 1443 (1947), clearly overrules Bardes v. Hawarden Bank, 178
U.S. 524 (igoo) and Schumacher v. Beeler, 293 U.S. 367 (1934) on the issue of federal juris-
diction in bankruptcy.
183 Unemployment Compensation Comm'n v. Aragon, 67 S. Ct. 245 (1947).
X84 Alma Motor Co. v. Timken-Detroit Axle Co., 67 S. Ct. 231 (1947).
85The Katzinger and MacGregor cases, 67 S. Ct. 421 (1947) and 67 S. Ct. 424 (1947);
McCulloch v. Kammerer Corp., 67 S. Ct. i165 (1947); Halliburton Oil Well Co. v. Walker,
67 S. Ct. 6 (1947). Milcor Steel Co. v. George A. Fuller Co., 316 U.S. 143 (1942) was Mr.
Justice Black's only previous majority patent opinion.
186 There were for Mr. Justice Black some lesser pleasures. ICC v. Inland Waterways
Corp., 39 U.S. 671 (1943), refusing to set aside an ICC order forcing midwest farmers to ship
their crops to the east by train instead of barges drew the wrath of Mr. Justice Black's angriest
dissent three years ago. The same case returned this year and Mr. Justice Black wrote the
opinion at this stage which virtually makes the old dissent the present law. ICC v. Mechling,
67 S. Ct. 894 (1947). In Albrecht v. United States, 67 S. Ct. 6o6 (1947) he recouped ground
lost in Muschany v. United States, 324 U.S. 49 (r945); and cf. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318
U.S. 8o (1943) and the same case, 67 S. Ct. 1575 (1947).
187 The trainee cases were Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 67 S. Ct. 639 (1947) and
Walling v. Nashville, C. and St. L. Ry., 67 S. Ct. 644 (1947).
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sistent. The alleged aberrations are either so unique or-in the case of the
trainee cases-so minor that'no basic change of philosophy can be found
in them. Certainly the clearest answer to the proposition, therefore, is
"unproved." This is particularly true as to the Harris case, since Mr.
Justice Black has never exhibited any great enthusiasm for a broad inter-
pretation of the search and seizure clause.
For Mr. Justice Reed, as for Mr. Chief Justice Vinson, 1946 was the
term of decision. His vote came close to controlling the disputed cases. And
for Mr. Justice Reed, more than almost any other member of the Court,
the process of decision is hard. Judicial temperament is something of a
curse and something of a blessing. It may give balm to the spirit after
decision is reached. But it does not make the path smooth.
Mr. Justice Reed has that kind of temperament. True enough, the
meditative process of decision continued to keep Mr. Justice Reed far
from the civil rights vanguard-this year in ten divided cases out of
twelve he found against the claimed civil right-but in other matters he
was less predictable. An example of his earnest moderateness is the United
Brotherhood labor antitrust case.' His most important opinions of the
year sustained the Hatch Act.x5 It is a significant tribute to Mr. Justice
Reed's character that he is able to stand at the-decisive middle of the
judicial road and still retain the apparent regard of all his brethren.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter enjoyed one of his most influential years since
coming to the Court. He wrote the opinion in Freeman v. Hewit."9° His re-
stricted notions of the right to counsel won acceptance from a five-man
majority,x9 and in his basic controversy with Mr. Justice Black over the
coverage of the Fourteenth Amendment in civil rights cases he remains
the dear-cut victor by one vote. 92 He was very frequently in dissent or in
special concurrence; but in the cases of greatest importance he was fairly
regularly of the majority. The switch of Vinson for Stone bids fair to make
the Frankfurter restrictive conception of civil rights dominant at last.
As a matter of clear, as well as convincing, presentation, Mr. Justice
Frankfurter's least happy effort was Angel v. Bullington; 93 but his opin-
ions in the Lewis and search and seizure cases were two of his finest. 94
188 United Brotherhood v. United States, 67 S. Ct. 775 (1947).
189 Hatch Act cases, 67 S. Ct. 556 (i947) and 67 S. Ct. 544 (1947).
Igo 67 S. Ct. 274 (1946). 19' Foster v. Illinois, 67 S. Ct. 1716 (1947).
192 Adamson v. California, 67 S. Ct. 1672 (i947).
X93 67 S. Ct. 657 (i947). The confusion for readers of this opinion is highlighted by a
case note in 56 Yale L. J. 1036 (1947).
194 Lewis case, 67 S. Ct. 677 (1947).
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The latter dissent, indeed, was one of the really great opinions of recent
years.
Even with pneumonia to slow him down, Mr. Justice Douglas wrote
approximately twice as many majority opinions as most of the members
of the Court. The Douglas efficient energy is one of the phenomena of the
profession, and this year it ran full force in steady rather than spectacular
work. His most important opinion upheld the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission order for adjustment of class freight rates, and gave him full op-
portunity to write the kind of basic essay in economics he most enjoys. 9 s
The opinion contains seventeen tables and one graph, and will serve equal-
ly well for the student of law and the student of economy. Mr. Justice
Douglas would probably deny that there could reasonably be a differ-
ence between the two. Probably his next most important opinion was
Craig v. Harney,196 upholding the right of the press to criticize a court
during a trial. From the standpoint of art for art's sake, the least satisfac-
tory Douglas opinion was one done jointly with Mr. Justice Black in the
Lewis case, 197 and the oddest quirk was the introduction to his foreman
case dissent.'18 As a clear, short essay making a point well, his dissent in
the National Lead antitrust case is one of his best.199
Mr. Justice Douglas' assumed political availability and his increasingly
frequent disagreements with Mr. Justice Black have given rise to the
charge that he is trimming his opinions to the times. In thinly-veiled form
that charge reached open statement this year. °° Yet the basis of the
charge is so flimsy that it is impossible to assess such supporting evidence
as it may have, and to date it must be chalked off as totally unfounded.
Justices Black and Douglas are no longer as nearly ioo per cent united in
conclusions as they were in former years, but as the tables above show,
their agreement in the major cases is virtually unanimous and their agree-
ment in the cases labeled "important" is extremely high. As a sheer guess,
it may be that the extraordinarily heavy work load the two are carrying
now precludes frequent detailed discussion of most of the cases. In any
event, out of the 330 volumes of reports, very few Supreme Court de-
19S New York v. ICC, 67 S. Ct. 207 (1947).
19667 S. Ct. 1249 (1947).
197 67 S. Ct. 677 (1947).
19S In Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 67 S. Ct. 789, 794 (1947), Mr. Justice Douglas
began his dissent with observations indicating a conviction that coverage of foremen by the
Wagner Act would be a really fundamental change in the economic order.
199 United States v. National Lead Co., 67 S. Ct. x634, 1655 (1947).
200 Schlesinger, The Supreme Court, I947, 35 Fortune, No. i, 73-5 (Jan., 1947).
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
cisions in our history have ever been important campaign topics.201 Per-
haps the least predictable Douglas opinion, for example, was the Trans-
wrap patent case 2 0 2 a matter which is scarcely likely to attract attention
in a smoke-filled political caucus.
The 1946 term was the outstanding year Mr. Justice Murphy has had
on the Supreme Court. He is now the fifth Justice in point of seniority, and
this year his assignments gave him as much serious business as he could
desire. Labor law continues to be the Murphy specialty and most of his
work involved some aspect of employer-employee relations.
In addition, Mr. Justice Murphy wrote the opinion upholding the last
major details of the Public Utility Holding Company Act, and in so doing
declared his broad conception of the commerce clause.203 He wrote the
opinion in Hickman v. Taylor,204 limiting the use of interrogatories before
trial; and his was the important conflict of laws opinion which has virtual-
ly limited the unpopular principles of Magnolia Petroleum v. Hunt to their
facts.20S He also wrote the Yellow Cab antitrust opinion.201S In short, Mr
Justice Murphy enjoyed a gratifying year. In dissent he was much as al-
ways, and was again with Mr. Justice Rutledge the most inveterate up-
holder of claimed civil rights.207
Like Mr. Justice Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Jackson's views prevailed
in a large number of the important cases, and his views were so nearly the
same as Frankfurter's that much of what has been said about the latter
applies equally well here. He wrote the opinion in the case of WOKO2 °
with simple clarity and conviction, and it and the decision upholding the
validity of provisions of the Home Owner's Loan ActV°9 are samples of his
best work.
.While Mr. Justice Jackson's results are almost identical with Mr. Jus-
tice Frankfurter's, his methods are radically different. For Jackson
cherishes that very practical end result which Frankfurter scorns. Thus
20x The Dred Scott case, 19 How. (U.S.) 393 (1857); Pollock v. Farmer's Loan and Trust
Co., i58.U.S. 6oi (I895); and Lochner v. New York, i98 U.S. 45 (iro5) are noteworthy, but
of course not the sole exceptions.
202 Transparent Wrap. Mach. Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co., 67 S. Ct. 61o (1947).
203 American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 67 S. Ct. 133 (1946).
204 67 S. Ct. 385 (1947).
205 Industrial Comm'n. v. McCartin, 67 S. Ct. 886 (1947).
206 United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 S. Ct. 156o (i947).
207 See Barnett, Mr. Justice Murphy, Civil Liberties, and the Holmes Tradition, 32 Corn.
L. Q. 177 (1946).
2os FCC v. WOKO Inc., 67 S. Ct. 213 (1947).
209 Fahey v. Mallonee, 67 S. Ct. 1552 (i947).
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the primary object of Jackson's essays in statutory interpretation is the
selection of the most desirable result; once having discovered that result,
it is the mere flick of a pen to prove that Congress meant the desirable.2"
While Mr. Justice Frankfurter's own description of the thought process of
statutory interpretation makes allowance for the desirable, it gives it no
such Jacksonian precedence."1 In the Frankfurter concept, the Judge
triumphs over self to declare law. In sum, the Jackson conservative
philosophy of life and the Frankfurter philosophy of law achieve almost
exactly the same results.
During the term, Mr. Justice Jackson continued a tendency to confuse
judgment with morals, to assume that his adversaries were not merely
wrong, but wicked. His dissents displayed a smug, tattle-tale virtue. For
example, in the Tower case, involving an alleged fraud in a Labor Board
election, Mr. Justice Jackson concluded his dissent with an observation
suggesting that the majority had no personal desire to prevent election
frauds;"' and in the Craig contempt case he concluded with a strong
suggestion that a craven majority was yielding to newspaper pressure.213
The Rutledge year was spent largely in dissent or concurrence. The
Justice wrote nine majority opinions. His Gibson opinion finally completed
clarification of the process for religious conscientious objectors to follow
in objecting to military service."1 The opinion obviously cbmes too late to
make much difference for this war; but it may clarify rights in a future
draft. His decision denying the Government recovery for negligent injury
done a soldier by defendants is of considerable interest.2-5 Both his Scheele
210 See for example the Jackson opinions in Western Union v. Lenroot, 323 U.S. 490 (1945);
United States v. Southeastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944); Fleming v. Mohawk
Lumber and Wrecking Co., 67 S. Ct. 1129, 1135 (1947).
2rZ See discussion by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in "Some Reflections on the Readings of
Statutes," 47 Col. L. Rev. 527 (1947).
22NLRB v. Tower Co., 67 S. Ct. 324, 330-33 (1947).
"13 Craig v. Harney, 67 S. Ct. 1249, 1263-65 (1947). Another example of this monopoly-of-
virtue style is the Jackson dissent, joined by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in SEC v. Chenery
Corp., 67 S. Ct. 1575 (1947). The dissent was held over the summer and filed on Oct. 6, 1947,
too late for the majority of the Court to deal with the points raised. 16 U.S. L. Week 4oo
(1947). In the dissent Jackson included among other epithets the observation that the Court
was giving encouragement 'to "conscious lawlessness" by permitting the SEC to prohibit
officers and directors of a corporation from speculating in the stock of the corporation during
reorganization. Such oral fireworks may be contrasted with the observations of Mr. Chief
Justice Hughes on the style of dissents: "Independence does not mean cantankerousness and a
judge may be a strong judge without being an impossible person. Nothing is more distressing
on any bench than the exhibition of a captious, impatient, querulous spirit." Hughes, The
Supreme Court of the United States 68 (x938).
214 Gibson v. United States, 67 S. Ct. 633 0947).
215 United States v. Standard Oil Co., 67 S. Ct. 16o4 (1947).
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
tax opinion and his Trailmobile veterans seniority opinion have been dis-
cussed above216 The latter was probably his most significant majority
opinion.
In concurrence and dissent, Mr. Justice Rutledge had a fruitful time.
His dissents in the Lewis, school bus, and right to counsel cases, and his
concurrence in Freeman v. Hewit were in themselves a solid year's work.217
Yet one difficulty with the path of regular concurrence or dissent is the
difficulty of hitting the jackpot every time. Mr. Justice Reed's dissent in
Angel v. Bullington Was very clear and scarcely needed additional ex-
pression;21 and the concurrence in the Agnew case2 1 9 concerning removal
of bank directors, seems hardly worth the bother.
The transition from Senator to Justice is not an easy one, as Mr.
Justice Black discovered ten years ago, and Mr. Justice Burton is having
the usual difficulties. A columnist's allegation that Burton is lazy2 ° is
patently grossly unfair; his opinions bear every evidence of the most
elaborate preparation. It is that evident painstaking thoroughness which
is slowing down his output,2 2 ' but which will probably stand him in good
stead as he catches up with many technical fields.
Certainly Mr. Justice Burton's most important opinion of the year wai
the National Lead Co. antitrust case.2 2 His most interesting dissent was in
the case of Willie Francis, the Louisiana convict who claimed double
jeopardy and cruel punishment when sent back to the electric chair a
second time after it had failed to function initially.223 His dissent here, his
participation in the dissent in the school bus case,2 2 4 and his participation
in the press contempt case majority- s indicate a complexity of notions
about civil rights which reduces to a less simple philosophy than that of
most of his bretheren. Why should Mr. Justice Burton have felt so
=6 Independent Warehouses v. Scheele, 67 S. Ct. io62 (1947) and Whirls v. Trailmobile
Co., 67 S. Ct. 982 (1947).
217The Lewis case, 67 S. Ct. 677, 720 (1946); Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing Tp.,
67 S. Ct. 504, 517 ('947); Foster v. Illinois, 67 S. Ct. 716, 1720 (1947); Freeman v. Hewit,
67 S. Ct. 274, 280 (i947).
218 67 S. Ct. 657, 662 (i947).
219 Board of Governors v. Agnew, 67 S. Ct. 411 (1947).
-o Drew Pearson, Washington Post, p. 15, col. 5 (June 23, 1947).
-' United States v. Carmack, 67 S. Ct. 252 (1947) is a typical example of a Burton opinion
which evidences not too little but too much work for the point involved.
United States v. National Lead Co., 67 S. Ct. 1634 (1947).
M3 Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 67 S. Ct. 374 (i947).
4 Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing Tp., 67 S. Ct. 504 (1946).
-Craig v. Harney, 67 S. Ct. r249 (i947).
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strongly about Willie Francis, whose case is of a sort which may never
occur again, and at the same time feel so indifferent to the pleas of the
defendant who because of his poverty.is tried and punished without
counsel?
VI. CONCLUSION AND PROSPECT
The public law has either stopped moving or is drifting to the right.
With the addition of new personnel, the philosophy of Justices Black,
Douglas, Murphy, and Rutledge weighs less heavily in the decisions of the
United States Supreme Court while that of Justices Frankfurter and Jack-
son tips the scales. The New Deal spirit in jurisprudence reached its peak
four or five years ago; it is in recession now. Scarcely a case decided at the
last term marks any material advance over anything gone before. Civil
rights, antitrust, trade regulation, the taxing power-the march now is
largely in place.- 6 .
In the course of the discussion of a position Senator George Norris
=6 Indeed, one might go farther. The Court has concluded ten terms since President Roose-
velt made his first appointment. The Court as a whole is a more conservative body than the
Court which convened in October, r937. For a discussion of the work of the "Old Court"
at its time of transition, see Sears, The Supreme Court and the New Deal, 12 Univ. Chi. L.
Rev. 14o (z944). Such a statement, of course, implies a judgment relative to the changing issues
of the times. Much of the Roosevelt platform in 1936 was good Republican doctrine by 1944.
Yesterday's advance guard tends to be today's old hat, and times change more than men.
Relative to the issues of the day, the New Deal appointed Court of today is more conservative
than the Court of yesterday.
The measure can be made by the men. Mr. Justice Black was on the Court in October 1937,
and is there today-there is no very perceptible change. Mr. Justice Douglas has succeeded
Mr. Justice Brandeis, and Mr. Justice Burton has succeeded Mr. Justice Roberts. The first
trade leaves the Court about where it was-the Douglas opinion on railroad rates this year
reads like a Brandeis brief. Burton for Roberts is something of a shift to the right if we com-
pare with the Roberts not of 1944 but of 1937. There is no evidence to date that Burton will
ever write an opinion equivalent for its day to those of Roberts in Nebbia v. New York, 291
U.S. 502 (1934), or in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (i94o).
We have gained Justices Reed, Murphy, and Rutledge as an exchange for Justices Suther-
land, Butler, and McReynolds. Here is a tilt to the left indeed; but no matter how diametrically
opposite each is to his precedessor, it must be remembered that each has only one vote. We
are trying to assess the status of an institution.
Mr. Justice Jackson took the position of Mr. Chief Justice Hughes by indirection, since
Stone became Chief Justice and Jackson succeeded him. But the swap in personnel was
Jackson for Hughes, and here indeed is a switch to the right. Most of the law today is a mere
logical extension of paths Hughes laid: free speech, Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (r931)
and Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938); freedom from torture, Brown v. Mississippi,
297 U.S. 278 (1936); the new contract clause, Home Bldg. and Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell,
290 U.S. 398 (1934); police power emancipated from freedom of contract, West Coast Hotel
Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). Mr. Justice Hughes needed pushing from the White
House only on the commerce clause, and then he gave us the base of modern law on that,
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 31o U.S. i (937). His was a creative liberalism.
Frankfurter for Cardozo was a shift to the right, and, as had been demonstrated, so was
Vinson for Stone. The upshot is fairly clear: three paces to the left, four to the right, and two
in place. The net effect is a move to the right.
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advocated, opponents once made a protest based on their convictions as to
what the Founding Fathers would have said. Senator Norris replied:
Probably if I had lived in the days of Washington I might have agreed with him.
But I have such great respect for our forefathers that it seems to me the way we can
honor them most is to try to progress and go a little bit further than they went, and
to carry the torch of civilization on a little bit further into the wilderness than our
forefathers carried it. I hope when I am gone that those who follow me will not stop
where I do but will carry on.=7
This attitude should be compared with that of the Lewis case, Freeman v.
Hewit, the Hatch Act cases, Adamson v. California, Foster v. Illinois, Harris
v. United States, United States v. National Lead Co., Transparent Wrap
Machine Co. v. Stokes & Smith Co., Bruce's Juices v. American Can Co.,
Kotch v. Board of River Commissioners, Fay v. New York, Gayes v. New
York, Carter v. Illinois, and others previously cited.28
Such a list can carry conviction to the reader only insofar as he shares
the social value judgments which the selection implies; and minimal
modesty requires the acknowledgment that in the minds of many a rea-
sonable man, perhaps some of these cases should be eliminated and others
added. And yet there is an irreducible core. Take, for example, the re-
affirmation of the principle that the Constitution permits a man, solely
because he is poor, to be convicted of a crime without counsel though he
cry for legal aid. Few will contend that such a decision, whatever else may
be said for it, is carrying the "torch of civilization a little bit further into
the wilderness."
=7 7oth Cong. Rec. 2519 (1929).
=8 A list to which some wouild add the denial of certiorari on Friedman v. Schwellenbach,
67 S. Ct. 979, 1302 (1947); the failure to grant the petition for rehearing in Colegrove v.
Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946), rehearing and reargument denied 67 S. Ct. 118, I99 (1946) (illinois
redistricting); Cook v. Fortson, cert. den. 67 S. Ct. 21 (1946), noted in 47 Col. L. Rev. 284
(1947), dealing with a similar problem in Georgia; and the 4 to 4 affirmance of United States
v. Pullman Co., 67 S. Ct. 1078, rehearing den., 67 S. Ct. I195 (i947).
